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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence that declaring independence significantly lowers per capita
GDP based on a large panel of countries covering the period 1950-2016. To do so, we rely on a semi-
parametric identification strategy that controls for the confounding effects of past GDP dynamics,
anticipation effects, unobserved heterogeneity, model uncertainty and effect heterogeneity. In a
difference-in-difference setting, we demonstrate that 30 years after newly formed states declared
independence, their inhabitants typically experience per capita GDP levels which lie 23% below
those of countries which in all relevant aspects most closely resembled their own country’s eco-
nomic situation just prior to independence. We subsequently propose a novel quadruple-difference
bias correction procedure to demonstrate the robustness of these findings. Finally, we develop a
two-step estimator to shed some light on the primary channels driving our results. We find tenta-
tive evidence that the adverse effects of independence decrease in population size, pointing to the
presence of economies of scale, and that they are also mitigated when newly independent states
avoid violent secession, liberalize their trade regime or use their new-found political autonomy to
democratize. We fail to find clear-cut evidence of the relevance of macroeconomic uncertainty or
the economic desirability of declaring independence by referendum.
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1 Introduction
Historically, state formation tended to be a tale of the aggregation of resources, power
and territory.1 Over the course of the last century, however, the world has witnessed a
persistent trend towards state fragmentation, raising the importance of understanding its
economic consequences. This is especially so since independence movements increasingly
embed their case in the economic realm (Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Gill, 2005). In the wake of the
Scottish independence referendum, for example, the Financial Times (2014) reports that
Alex Salmond, Scotland’s first minister who is leading the campaign for inde-
pendence, said [...] that each household would receive an annual “independence
bonus” of £2,000 - or each individual £1,000 - within the next 15 years if the
country votes to leave the UK. The UK government, in contrast, claimed that
if Scots rejected independence each person would receive a “UK dividend of
£4,000 . . . for the next 20 years”.
In spite of its current poignancy, there is still surprisingly little empirical research on
the economic impact of secession and our knowledge on how independence processes have
affected economic trajectories of actual newly independent countries (NICs) remains highly
imperfect. In this light, this paper presents estimates of monetary per capita independence
gains/losses for a large panel of countries for the period covering 1950-2013.
There are at least three motivations for this exercise. First of all, the theoretical litera-
ture on the relation between state fragmentation, state size and economic growth delivers
contradictory results. Hence, it remains theoretically ambiguous whether and to what
extent a declaration of independence can be expected to meaningfully affect the economic
outlook of a NIC. Second, the empirical literature on this subject is disappointingly small
(Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Stermsˇek, 2015). This implies that it is also unclear what can be
learned from past instances of state fragmentation. Finally, the expected economic impact
of secession does shape people’s views on the merits of independence today and thus also
shapes electoral behavior.2 Getting a clearer view on the actual economic consequences
of secession should serve to yield a more efficient democratic decision-making process.
In order to provide a preliminary view on the existence as well as the magnitude
of the independence dividend, Figure 1a presents difference-in-difference estimates of the
impact of declaring independence on the relative economic performance of NICs, where the
‘relative economic performance’ of a country is here defined as the percentage discrepancy
between its own and worldwide per capita GDP. More specifically, the figure plots the
relative economic performance of NICs ten years after their independence declaration
against their relative economic performance ten years prior to independence. The vertical
1See, for instance, Tilly (1990) and Lake and O’Mahony (2004).
2Curtice (2013), for instance, reports opinion research results indicating that 52% of Scots would support
independence if it were clear beforehand that this would make them £500 a year better off, but that
support for independence drops to 15% if this decision is anticipated to come at a yearly cost of £500.
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distance of each point on the graph to the ray of equality reflects a difference-in-difference
estimate for the net gain of independence for a specific NIC. As can be seen, the figure
provides tentative evidence that the decision to declare independence did affect the relative
economic performance of most NICs, and sometimes substantially so. Also apparent is the
heterogeneity of this effect across countries, where some NICs outperformed the rest of the
world in terms of per capita GDP growth during the period under consideration, whereas
others seemingly incurred an independence cost. Nevertheless, the population-weighted
difference-in-difference estimate suggests that the net gain of independence tended to be
negative and decreased per capita income by roughly 38%, 10 years after independence.
Figure 1: Trends in per capita GDP around a declaration of independence
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Note: Figure 1a plots the relative economic performance of each NIC in the 10th post-independence year against
its relative economic performance in the 10th pre-independence year. Figure 1b plots average per capita GDP
growth in the group of NICs, in a period stretching from 10 years before up until 10 years after their declaration of
independence. The number of years before (-) or after (+) secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
The crude correlation in figure 1a, however, could also be driven by other omitted fac-
tors. Indeed, several challenges complicate the estimation of the causal impact of declaring
independence on economic outcomes emanating from omitted variable bias, simultaneity,
anticipation effects, effect heterogeneity and model uncertainty. First, as shown in figure
1a, NICs and established countries differ quite extensively in terms of their underlying
socio-economic structure. More specifically, the figure suggests that the group of NICs
is predominantly composed of economically less developed regions.3 Therefore, a sim-
ple comparison of the economic performance of NICs vis-a´-vis established states may not
only reflect the effect of declaring independence, but may also reflect the effects of differing
growth determinants which were already apparent in the pre-independence period. Sec-
ond, as illustrated in figure 1b, NICs, in the run-up to their declaration of independence,
typically experience sharp declines in per capita GDP growth rates. As per capita GDP
trajectories tend to be highly persistent, this raises an obvious endogeneity concern. In
3Table 1 provides a more detailed account.
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other words, it is important to distinguish the causal impact of declaring independence
on future growth potential ruling out any feedback-effects of past growth dynamics that
might have affected the incentives to secede. Third, this pre-secession growth-dip is also
consistent with the presence of anticipation effects, indicating that state fragmentation
may already have an economic impact in the years prior to the actual decision to secede.
Failure to account for these ex ante effects will generally result in an underestimation
of the full economic impact of secession. Fourth, the economic impact of declaring in-
dependence might differ both across countries and across time, such that an aggregate
independence dividend estimate may be sensitive to the chosen time horizon and country
sample. Finally, the lack of convergence on the functional form capturing the economic
impact of declaring independence in the theoretical literature raises concerns with respect
to the sensitivity of the estimated parameters to specific functional form assumptions.
To mitigate these concerns, this paper develops a semi-parametric estimation strategy
rooted in the synthetic control method pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). This
methodology allows to simulate, for each NIC, the counterfactual post-independence per
capita GDP trajectory that would be observed, in the hypothetical case that it would
have decided not to declare independence. By comparing these simulated trajectories
with their observed counterparts, we are able to track both country-specific and aggre-
gate independence dividends over time. Our central results show robust and statistically
significant evidence that the decision to secede lowered per capita GDP trajectories in
NICs, and persistently so. The baseline estimates of the aggregate long-run welfare cost
of independence, in terms of per capita GDP foregone, range from 20% to 40%. Yet, there
is considerable cross-country heterogeneity in the economic impact of secession.
To address a well-known drawback of this methodology, namely the difficulty of as-
sessing the statistical significance of the estimates, we extend the placebo test approach
put forward by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2007, 2010, 2014) to propose a novel
quadruple-difference bias correction procedure. Most reassuringly, we find comparatively
little effect on per capita GDP when applying the simulation procedure on countries un-
affected by state fragmentation, while the negative per capita GDP discrepancy between
NICs and their counterfactuals in the post-independence period also clearly exceeds the
discrepancy between both typically observed in the pre-independence period. In addition,
our main conclusions also remain qualitatively unchanged when we parametrically control
for potential contamination effects stemming from the economic effects of independence
in other recently formed states. Although these findings underscore that our estimated
independence dividends are unlikely to be driven by simulation inaccuracy, matching inac-
curacy or spillover effects, we show that not correcting for these three potential sources of
bias tends to inflate both the estimated net cost of independence as well as its persistence.
One advantage of estimating country-specific independence gains, is that we can also
rely on these estimates to characterize their implications for a number of historical in-
dependence waves. Doing so, we find that our results largely corroborate the existing
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literature. With respect to the earliest independence waves in our sample, we find that
former British colonies tend to economically outperform their former Belgian, French and
Portuguese counterparts in the post-independence period, in line with the often mentioned
arguments that the British left behind better institutions and a better educated working
population. Concerning the more recent independence waves, we find that the Soviet
breakup had the most adverse economic impact. This finding resonates with the view
that rent-seeking was more pervasive in former Soviet countries than in the other newly
formed Eastern and Central European countries, whose geographical locations moreover
generated stronger incentives to quickly implement sound economic reforms to maximize
the prospects of European Union membership. A broader comparison furthermore indi-
cates that the earlier decolonization waves had less adverse economic effects than the more
recent break-ups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, suggesting that there
may have been economic gains associated with the elimination of colonial drain.
Interestingly, our empirical findings also offer a dissenting appraisal of the transition
literature, suggesting that the estimated transition costs for newly formed transition coun-
tries are actually mainly driven by the economic effects of their independence declaration.
This is related to the complication that the independence declarations of some NICs in
our sample coincided with their transition from a planned to a market economy. This, in
turn, implies that the estimated independence dividends for these newly formed transition
countries may at least partially reflect what are actually transition costs, which would
have been born irrespective of the decision to declare independence. Nevertheless, it turns
out that parametrically correcting these independence dividend estimates by removing
synthetic control estimates of these transition costs in a subsample of transition countries
that did not declare independence in the 1990’s does not qualitatively alter our findings.
In sharp contrast, purging the estimated independence dividends from the adverse effects
that can plausibly attributed to the transition process suggests that more than half of the
estimated independence costs for newly formed transition countries can effectively be at-
tributed to their declaration of independence. Thus, our findings reverberate with Linn’s
(2004) concern that the existing literature on transition in Central and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union may overestimate transition costs by neglecting that most of
these countries simultaneously decided to break away from their mother countries.4
Since the primary purpose of this paper is to conduct a first, careful attempt to quan-
tify the overall economic effects of independence for a broad number of historical instances
of state fragmentation, it is important to recognize that our results only reflect the con-
sequences of each particular country’s independence experience. In a second and more
4More specifically, Linn (2004, p. 2) mentions that “when one reviews the economic and econometric
literature on transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU, one finds a large number of regression
analyses relating economic growth over the transition years as the independent variable to a number of
explanatory variables, usually consisting of a mix of parameters reflecting so-called ‘initial conditions’ and
‘market-oriented reforms’ ” but goes on to worry that “in none of the econometric studies is there an
explicit recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union broke apart into independent nations”.
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speculative part, we move beyond mere description and try to extract more general lessons
from the available historical episodes of state breakup. We do so by looking for patterns
in these estimated independence dividends that can identify the primary channels through
which secession affected growth potential in these newly formed states.
For this purpose, we develop a two-step procedure that regresses the estimated in-
dependence payoffs on a number of potential channels: trade openness, country size,
macroeconomic uncertainty, the intensity of conflict and the level of democracy. In ad-
dition to its importance in terms of policy implications, this provides a meaningful way
to empirically evaluate the various claims laid out in the existing literature. We find ten-
tative evidence that the adverse economic effects of independence dissipate when trade
barriers fall, democratic institutions improve, the population size of the newly formed
state grows and post-independence military violence is avoided. Gauging the relative im-
portance of these channels over a wide range of historical instances of state fragmentation,
trade often turns out as the strongest predictor of post-independence economic perfor-
mance, underscoring its prevalence in many contemporary independence discussions. We
fail to find clear-cut evidence of the relevance of macroeconomic uncertainty and the eco-
nomic desirability of declaring independence by referendum. Finally, a robustness check
parametrically controls for the potential endogeneity of the estimated independence gains
and their potential determinants to demonstrate the robustness of the results.
Our argument is closely related to existing economic thinking on the consequences of
state fragmentation, which can at least be traced back to the conference on the Economic
Consequences of the Size of Nations held by the International Economic Association in
1957, the proceedings of which were published in a compendium in 1960 (Robinson, 1960).
A persistent narrow focus on this related issue of country size, however, seemingly pre-
vented the ensuing literature to develop a more comprehensive approach to study the
economic impact of state-breakup. In addition, the relation between state size and eco-
nomic growth remains theoretically ambiguous. Thus, although country size is considered
growth-neutral in early neo-classical, closed-market growth models such as Solow (1956),
more recent work in growth theory includes either some form of agglomeration effect
(Krugman, 1991) or a scale effect (Romer, 1986; Barro & Sala-i Martin, 2004; Aghion
& Howitt, 2009), benefiting growth potential in larger states.5 Larger countries are also
thought to benefit from scale economies in the public sector, due to their ability to spread
the costs of public policy over a larger population (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998; Alesina &
Spolaore, 2003). Nevertheless, Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) and Ramondo and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010) contend that smaller countries can compensate the costs imposed
by the limited size of their domestic market by increased trade openness. Furthermore,
it has been frequently asserted that the free-rider problem is less disruptive of collective
action in smaller states, facilitating a more flexible and effective economic policy (Kuznets,
5Jones (1999, p. 143), for instance, argues that in reviewing three classes of endogenous growth models
“the size of the economy affects either the long-run growth rate or the long-run level of per capita income.”.
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1960; Streeten, 1993; Armstrong & Read, 1995; Yarbrough & Yarbrough, 1998). Finally,
smaller countries may benefit from a more homogenous population, easing the accumula-
tion of social capital and generalized trust (Armstrong & Read, 1998).
Another related line of research emphasizes the negative effects implied by the policy
uncertainty and the fear of potential conflict arising from the decision to secede. Onour
(2013) develops a macroeconomic model to analyze the adverse effects on asset market
stability and government debt sustainability of a small open economy splitting up in two
independent parts. Other studies maintain that a high propensity of policy change may
reduce both investment and the speed of economic development by triggering domestic
and foreign investors to delay economic activity or exit the domestic economy by investing
abroad (Gupta & Venieris, 1986; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1996) and inducing
purchasers of government bonds to require higher risk premiums, increasing the cost of
providing government (Somers & Vaillancourt, 2014).6
The political science literature, on the other hand, has emphasized that secession gen-
erally involves some degree of (military) conflict (Fearon, 1998; Spolaore, 2008), resulting
in human capital losses, reductions in investment and trade diversion, all of which are gen-
erally associated with lower levels of growth. Additionally, these costs may be persistent
as Fearon and Laitin (2003b) find that NICs face drastically increased odds of civil war
onset, possibly due to the loss of coercive backing from the mother country. Following
Murdoch and Sandler (2004), the impact of secession is thus expected to be codetermined
by the existence, intensity, duration and timing of conflict.
In examining the influence of colonial heritage on post-independence economic perfor-
mance, a different strand of the literature stresses the relevance of the initial conditions left
behind by the mother country (Acemoglu, Simon, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, John-
son, & Robinson, 2002). Nunn (2007, 2008), for instance, uncovers a negative relation
between the number of slaves exported in former African colonies and their current eco-
nomic performances, suggesting that Africa’s underdevelopment since independence can
be partially explained by the weakening effect of these slave trades on domestic property
right institutions. In a similar spirit, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) conclude that colonial
origin lies at the root of contemporary growth differentials in Latin America and Africa
due to institutional persistence.
In addition, the more recent transition economy literature points out that the identity
of neighboring countries may matter too in shaping incentives to implement political and
economic reform (Roland, 2002; Fidrmuc, 2003).7 In the context of the Soviet breakup,
moreover, Suesse (2017, p. 32) finds that prospective secessions economies may severely
disrupt trade flows such that “the possibility of secession may be enough to deter trade or
6Walker (1998) mentions that when the intensity to secede is large, a declaration of independence may
actually reduce policy uncertainty since this decision clarifies that the current government will collapse.
7A more comprehensive discussion of the economic impact of the demise of colonial rule in Africa and Latin
America is offered by Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson (2007) and Prados De La Escosura (2009).
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investment, even without secession actually having taken place”.
One hitherto overlooked issue is the temporal coincidence of surges of secession and
surges of democracy (Spencer, 1998; Alesina & Spolaore, 1997; Alesina et al., 2000).
Dahl, Gates, Hegre, and Strand (2013), for instance, provide empirical evidence that
the wavelike shape of the global democratization process is (at least partially) explained
by the wavelike shape of state entry, finding that NICs are initially considerably more
democratic compared to the rest of the world but are also more susceptible to subsequent
reversal. Although it is unclear whether secession operates as a democratization tool
or whether democracies are more liable to demands for autonomy, this suggests that the
effect of declaring independence is at least partially contingent on ensuing democratization
processes in NICs.8 The link between democracy and economic development, however, is
itself subject to an inconclusive academic literature.9
This study is also directly related to a relatively small empirical literature that has
attempted to uncover the link between state fragmentation and economic performance.
Sujan and Sujanova (1994) develop a macroeconomic simulation model to estimate the
short-term economic impact of the Czechoslovakian dissolution into the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, concluding that the decision to separate reduced GDP by 2.2% in the Czech
Republic and by 5.7% in Slovakia. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) use a difference-in-
difference approach to establish, for a restricted number of former colonies, that there
may be substantial growth gains from the elimination of extractive institutions. Some´
(2013) relies on a synthetic control approach to demonstrate that former African colonies
that declared independence through wars suffer larger income losses than African colonies
that declared independence without conflict, at least in the short to medium run. Most
recently, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Stermsˇek (2015) use panel data on the constituent parts of
former Yugoslavia to estimate an independence dividend concluding that, once relevant
factors such as war are taken into account, there is no statistically significant relation
between achieving independence and economic performance while independence achieved
by conflict seriously dents growth prospects. Small sample size and conflicting results,
however, limit the extent to which these results can be extrapolated to other instances of
state fragmentation. Moreover, these models generally do not account for omitted variable
bias, simultaneity, anticipation effects and model uncertainty.
Other empirical studies have focused on estimating the economic effects of unification.
In a cross-country set-up, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) propose a three-stage least squares
approach to analyze the market size effect and the trade reduction effect of 123 hypothet-
ical pairwise mergers between neighboring countries concluding that full integration, on
average, would reduce annual growth by 0.11% while market integration would boost it by
an estimated 0.12%. Abadie et al. (2007, 2014) use the synthetic control method to tease
8Conversely, these findings also suggest that the link between democracy and economic development may be
confounded by the economic impact of state fragmentation, an issue overlooked in the existing literature.
9Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno (2005) provide a recent summary of this literature.
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out the per capita economic payoff of the 1990 German reunification for West Germany,
concluding that actual 2003 West German per capita GDP levels are about 12% below
their potential level due to unification.
Finally, the link between country size and economic performance is scrutinized in a
number of empirical studies which “typically find that smaller country size is likely to be
associated with higher concentration of the production structure, higher trade openness,
higher commodity and geographic concentration of trade flows [and] larger government”
(Damijan, Damijan, & Parcero, 2013, p. 6). Whether country size affects growth remains
disputed, as some studies fail to find any significant relationship (Backus, Kehoe, & Kehoe,
1992; Milner & Westaway, 1993) while others report a significant negative relation with
either per capita GDP (Easterly & Kraay, 2000; Rose, 2006; Damijan et al., 2013) or
economic growth (Alouini & Hubert, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construc-
tion of the dataset, provides data sources and reports some descriptive statistics. Section 3
presents the independence dividend estimates emanating from the semi-parametric route.
This section also contains a variety of robustness checks. Section 4 presents empirical
evidence on the channels through which secession affects economic growth potential and
also performs a number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
To shed light on the relation between declarations of independence and the ensuing per
capita GDP dynamics in newly formed states, we construct an annual panel comprising
196 countries and covering the period 1950-2016. In what follows, 80 of those countries
will be referred to as ‘established countries’, in the sense that these are countries that al-
ready gained independence before 1950. The remaining 122 countries will be called ‘newly
independent countries’ (NICs), reflecting that these countries declared independence any-
where between 1950 and 2013. To identify the year of independence of each country in the
sample, we primarily rely on and extend data on state entry as reported in Griffiths and
Butcher (2013). Table A2 provides a full list of all NICs and their year of independence.
Our dependent variable is the log of per capita GDP, which will proxy the economic
performance of these countries, while our choice of control variables is primarily rooted
in the growth literature. Depending on the specification, it includes the average years
of education, life expectancy and population density to capture differences in terms of
human capital and differential population effects. As it is argued to be a determinant
of both economic performance and state fragmentation, we include a measure of trade
openness.10 Similarly, given that democratization processes appear to be both related to
the decision to secede and (possibly) to economic outcomes, we also utilize a composite
index of democracy. Furthermore, as independence is rarely achieved without some form
10See, for instance, Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina et al. (2000) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
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of conflict, we include the per capita number of war deaths as reported by Bethany and
Gleditsch (2005) to capture the adverse economic effects associated with the existence,
intensity and duration of military conflict.11 In addition, mimicking Gibler and Miller
(2014a), we define a ‘political instability’-dummy indicating whether a country experienced
a two-standard-deviation change in its democracy score during the previous observation
year. To control for the adverse effects of macroeconomic instability, we include a dummy
variable indicating known banking and debt crises from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).12
We draw on a wide variety of data sources to obtain a dataset that is as extensive as
possible. Capitalizing on prior work by Fearon and Laitin (2003a), to address the potential
issues of measurement error and misreporting of per capita GDP13, we depart from the real
per capita GDP information contained in The Madison Project (2017), we subsequently
maximally extend these estimates forward and backwards relying on the growth rate of real
per capita income provided by the World Bank (2016) and finally approximate remaining
missing observations by use of a third-order polynomial in (i) a country’s level of CO2
emissions (World Resources Institute, 2015; World Bank, 2016), (ii) a year dummy and
(iii) a region dummy. To make sure that our results are not driven by the data construction
procedure, we also construct an alternative index of real per capita GDP by aggregating per
capita GDP information from multiple data sources, though this did not affect any of our
conclusions.14 With regard to the alternative growth determinants, we generally rely on a
similar third-order polynomial approximation strategy to synthetize relevant information
contained in various data sources. Appendix A reports all relevant data sources for these
constructed variables, provides a more detailed description of the variable-specific data
manipulation procedure utilized and reports some diagnostics.
Table 1, then, reports the most important descriptive statistics separately for estab-
lished countries and (future) NICs while also assessing to what extent both groups sig-
nificantly differ from each other in terms of these underlying growth determinants. The
results confirm our prior findings: (future) NICs, on average, are significantly poorer in
per capita terms and they also tend to have a less educated population, a lower life ex-
pectancy and less democratic institutions. Nevertheless, they tend to be somewhat less
sensitive to military conflict, experience less (known) instances of financial crises and, as
suggested in the existing literature, they also tend to be more stable politically and favor
a more liberal trade regime. All in all, these summary statistics thus suggest that NICs
manifest less favorable growth determinants when compared to more established states.
11We primarily rely on the ‘best estimates’ of each specific country-year number of battle deaths. In case
these are unavailable, we take the simple average of the lowest and highest estimates instead.
12To preserve a maximal amount of observations in the analysis, missing values of the index are set to 0.
13For a discussion of data variability and consistentization issues across successive versions of the Penn
World Table, see Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou, and Subramanian (2013); for a discussion on the
reliability of pre-independence per capita income estimates of former Soviet states, see Fischer (1994).
14As noted in Appendix A, baseline per capita GDP correlates strongly with the alternative estimates, at
0.99 for their 11214 common observations. Results based on these alternative per capita GDP estimates
are available from the authors on request.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Established countries Newly independent countries
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. P-value
GDP per capita 4809 8385.96 13553.55 7189 3830.14 5473.454 -4555.81 0.00
Population (millions) 4868 47.33 146.793 7539 9.71 25.265 -37.63 0.00
Years of schooling 4627 6.68 3.24 6533 5.08 3.256 -1.60 0.00
Life expectancy 4527 66.06 10.834 7077 58.39 12.097 -7.68 0.00
Openness 4702 0.54 .418 5687 0.84 .539 0.31 0.00
Battle deaths per head 4868 0.00 0 7539 0.00 0 0.00 0.02
Population density 4868 270.11 1539.554 7495 134.50 444.31 -135.61 0.00
Democracy 4806 23.61 13.731 5410 17.45 10.421 -6.16 0.00
Political instability 4806 0.00 .058 5410 0.00 .03 -0.00 0.01
Macroeconomic instability 5122 0.46 .91 8079 0.09 .447 -0.38 0.00
Note: Data construction and sources provided in section 2 and appendix A. Statistics for NICs include information
pertaining to the pre-independence period. The last column reports the p-value for the two-sided t-test that the two means
are equal.
3 Semi-parametric estimation of the independence dividend
This section follows a semi-parametric route to identify the causal relation between declara-
tions of independence and ensuing per capita GDP dynamics in NICs. After outlining the
general estimation strategy, we first provide a motivating example. Subsequently, we de-
rive baseline estimates of both country-specific and aggregate independence payoffs. Before
discussing the implications of our estimates pertaining to the various independence waves
in our sample, a subsequent subsection first formulates a finite-sample bias-correction pro-
cedure to control for the potential biases stemming from simulation inaccuracy, matching
inaccuracy and spillover effects. A final subsection performs a variety of robustness checks
and most notably deals with the complication that the independence declarations of some
NICs in our sample coincided with their transitions from planned to market economies:
a process which may well have engendered economic consequences in itself, but whose
potential economic effects would be subsumed in our independence dividend estimates.
3.1 Estimation strategy
To mitigate both omitted variable bias, endogeneity and heterogeneity concerns and to
deal with the potential problem of model uncertainty, we rely on the synthetic control
method pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and further developed in Abadie et
al. (2007, 2010, 2014). Although the details of this approach are deferred to appendix B,
which provides a more formal description, in a nutshell, this method estimates the effect
of a given policy shock (in this case, declaring independence) by comparing the evolution
of an outcome variable of interest (in this case, log per capita GDP) for the affected
country with the evolution of the same variable for a so-called ‘synthetic control’ country.
This synthetic control country, then, is constructed as a weighted average of unaffected
control countries (in this case, all other independent countries which did not recently gain
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independence themselves) that matches as closely as possible the country affected by the
policy shock, before the shock occurs, for a number of unaffected predictors of the outcome
variable. Intuitively, the trajectory of the outcome variable in the synthetic control country
can be understood to mimic what would have been the path of this variable in the affected
country, if the policy shock had never occurred.
Appendix B highlights how the primary strength of the synthetic control method lies
in the lack of conditions it imposes on unobserved characteristics, making it robust for
the confounding effects of time-varying unobserved characteristics at the country level as
long as the number of pretreatment periods is large and the pre-independence match is
good. Moreover, as long as the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, this estimator is
robust to endogeneity as well. For example, if secession partly happens as a reaction to
falling per capita GDP levels, by definition, the per capita GDP levels of the synthetic
control country match with those of the seceding country in the pre-independence period
such that these unfavorable past GDP dynamics should manifest their potential economic
effects in the synthetic control unit as well. In contrast to a panel regression framework,
this method also safeguards against flattening out useful variation in the economic impact
of secession across countries and time, by allowing the estimation of both country-specific
and aggregate net independence dividends over time. Finally, this method does not require
formal modeling nor estimation of any of the population parameters associated with the
observed growth determinants, making it more robust against model uncertainty.
3.2 A motivating example
To illustrate this methodology, consider the example of Ukraine, which declared itself
independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. To estimate what would have been the post-
independence per capita GDP trajectory of Ukraine in absence of secession, we rely on
the remaining 153 countries in our sample which were independent in 1991, but were not
confronted with state state fragmentation between 1981 and 1991, to construct a weighted
average country that best resembles Ukraine in the pre-independence period for a number
of growth predictors. As it turns out, the optimal set of weights constructs this synthetic
version of Ukraine as a weighted average of - in decreasing order of their corresponding
weights - Malaysia, Romania, South Korea and Australia, see table 2.
Table 2: Optimal weights for synthetic Ukraine
Country w∗
Malaysia .562
Romania .276
South Korea .082
Australia .08
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Table 3 below suggests that the synthetic version of Ukraine, in effect, provides a much
better comparison for pre-independence Ukraine than the global average of our sample. As
is apparent from the table, average pre-independence per capita GDP levels in Ukraine are
practically indistinguishable from their synthetic counterpart, in contrast to the somewhat
lower levels witnessed in the rest of the world during this period. Moreover, the synthetic
version of Ukraine is also much more similar to the actual pre-independence Ukraine
in terms of population, population density, trade openness, educational attainment, life
expectancy and the per capita number of battle deaths suffered.
Table 3: Predictor balance before secession (1981-1990)
Predictor Ukraine Synthetic Ukraine World
Per capita GDP 5214.203 5248.127 4574.852
log Population 17.744 16.756 18.801
Population density 84.17 87.31 142.414
Educational attainment 9.065 7.782 5.411
Life expectancy 69.98 69.858 64.065
Trade openness 1.019 .833 .315
Battle deaths (per 1000 heads) 0 0 .027
Note: Growth predictors are averaged over the 1981-1990 period. The last column reports
population-weighted averages computed over all independent countries.
The central intuition behind the synthetic control method, then, is that the only
potentially economically meaningful difference between Ukraine and its synthetic ver-
sion post-1991 is that Ukraine declared independence whereas its synthetic version did
not. Therefore, to derive the economic significance of the Ukrainian declaration of inde-
pendence, we can compare the post-independence per capita GDP trajectories of now-
independent Ukraine and its synthetic version. To do so, the left panel of figure 2 below
plots the evolution of log per capita GDP in Ukraine (full line) as well as synthetic Ukraine
(dashed line) between 1960 and 2011. Note, first, that both series are practically indis-
tinguishable during the entire pre-independence period. Thus, even though this synthetic
version of Ukraine was constructed by only taking into account the last 10 years prior
to independence, it turns out to be well capable of assessing Ukranian per capita GDP
dynamics over the entire 1960-1990 period.15 Combined with the close fit obtained for the
pre-independence growth predictors in both groups, as reported in table 3, this suggests
that the proposed combination of other independent countries adequately reproduces the
economic situation in Ukraine in absence of state fragmentation.
15The slight diversion between both series in the pre-independence period might suggest the presence of
anticipation effects in the years preceding the Ukrainian declaration of independence. To take these into
account, as suggested by Abadie et al. (2010), we redid the exercise redefining the timing of independence
to have occurred three years prior to the actual decision to secede. None of the results are qualitatively
affected by this.
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The estimated economic effect of the Ukrainian declaration of independence is given
by the difference between the actual and synthetic trajectories in the post-independence
period. For this reason, the right panel of figure 2 plots the yearly gaps in per capita GDP
between Ukraine and its synthetic counterpart for a period stretching from 30 years prior
up until 20 after Ukraine’s secession from the Soviet Union. Note that, since both series
are expressed in logarithmic form, the discrepancy between both reflects the percentage
payoff of having declared independence in terms of per capita GDP foregone.
Figure 2: Trends in per capita GDP: Ukraine versus synthetic Ukraine
7.
5
8
8.
5
9
9.
5
lo
g 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 G
D
P
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Actual with secession Synthetic without secession
(a) Per capita GDP: Ukraine vs. synthetic Ukraine
-1
-.5
0
G
ap
 in
 lo
g 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 G
D
P
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20
Years of independence
(b) The economic impact of secession (Ukraine)
Note: The left figure plots the log per capita GDP trajectories in Ukraine (full line) and synthetic Ukraine (dashed
line) between 1961 and 2011; the right figure plots the discrepancy between both trajectories during the same period.
The Ukranian independence declaration is marked by the vertical red dashed line.
The figure suggests that the Ukranian declaration of independence had an immediate
and increasingly adverse impact on per capita GDP levels in the first five years after se-
cession. After this initial negative payoff, however, our results indicate that Ukraine never
fully recovered in the ensuing 15 years but, on the contrary, consistently underperformed
vis-a´-vis its synthetic counterpart. This suggests that, at least in the Ukranian case, the
negative independence dividend is persistent. Moreover, the estimated long-run cost im-
plies that, 20 years after its declaration of independence, Ukrainian per capita GDP still
lies around 82% below its potential level due to state fragmentation.
3.3 Baseline results
As explained in the previous section, a closer inspection of the Ukrainian case through
the lens of the synthetic control method suggests that the net payoff of independence
is large and negative. Nevertheless, Ukraine might be an outlier in terms of both the
immediate and persistent effects of declaring independence, limiting extrapolation poten-
tial. Therefore, subject to data availability, this subsection applies the synthetic control
method to each NIC in the sample and characterizes both country-specific and aggregate
independence dividends as well as their evolution over time.
Figure 3 displays several versions of the results of this exercise. First, consider the top-
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left panel which plots the results seperately for each available NIC in our sample. The gray
lines represent the per capita GDP gaps between each NIC and its respective synthetic
version (corresponding to the results displayed in figure 2b) in the period stretching from
10 years before up until 30 years after their declaration of independence. The superimposed
black line depicts the yearly population-weighted gap in the sample while the superimposed
red line captures the average gap computed over the entire pre- and the post-independence
period respectively. Apparent from this figure is the large cross-country heterogeneity in
the economic impact of secession, which clearly shows several examples of NICs appearing
to have benefited in economic terms from having declared independence.16
As the figure also indicates, the synthetic control method provides a reasonably good
fit for the per capita GDP trajectories between NICs and their synthetic counterparts in
the pre-independence period. The average pre-independence RMSPE in the full sample is
about 0.102, which is quite small but does reflect that NICs already underperformed some-
what relative to their synthetic counterparts in the pre-independence period. More specif-
ically, per capita GDP levels in NICs on average lie 0.7% below those of their synthetic
versions even in the last 10 years prior to their respective declarations of independence. In
the post-independence period, however, their underperformance clearly worsens and the
average percentage discrepancy increases to -21%. Interestingly, NICs do not appear to
recover in the longer run as the population-weighted average independence dividend equals
-23.2% in the 30th post-independence year. In other words, when their country celebrates
its 30th birthday, inhabitants of NICs typically experience per capita GDP levels which lie
23% below those of countries which, in all relevant aspects, most closely resembled their
own country’s economic situation just prior to its decision to secede.
Nevertheless, figure 3a also indicates that the synthetic control method fails to ad-
equately reproduce per capita GDP trajectories for some NICs in the pre-independence
period. East Timor, for instance, is the country with the worst pre-independence fit (RM-
SPE=0.472). Given its extraordinary low pre-independence per capita GDP trajectory, it
should come as no surprise that its growth path cannot be adequately approximated by
any linear combination of the available control countries. By extension, this complication
applies to all NICs with extreme values in their pre-independence characteristics. As the
post-independence gaps of these poorly fitted cases may merely reflect differences in their
underlying economic characteristics, rather than actual independence dividends17, figures
3b to 3d plot the results when the sample is progressively restricted to include only the
80%, 60%, 40% and 20% best matched cases in terms of their pre-independence RMSPE.
In each of these trimmed samples, the synthetic control method provides an excellent fit
(the associated average RMSPE’s equal 0.063, 0.048, 0.036 and 0.024 respectively). Sacri-
ficing quantity for quality, however, does not qualitatively affect our primary conclusions:
16Country-specific results are reported in table A3, while figure 11 connects the implications of our results
to the existing literature on a number of historical instances of state fragmentation.
17Since they are unlikely to even approximately satisfy conditions (1A) through (3A).
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each of these figures suggests that NICs face immediate and increasing costs of secession in
the first 5 years after they gain independence, while these costs also appear quite persistent
and reduce per capita GDP levels by anywhere between 15%-30% in the long run.
Since there does not appear to be a consensus on the optimal cut-off of pre-independence
RMSPE to avoid biases stemming from poor-fit, the bottom figure utilizes a more data-
driven procedure to impose a threshold value (or caliper) defining the maximal allowed
RMSPE. More specifically, in the tradition of propensity-score matching, Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985) suggest using an optimal caliper of 0.25 times the standard deviation of the
linear propensity score. Adapting this to the present context, figure 3f imposes a caliper
amounting to 0.5 times the samplewide standard deviation in pre-independence RMSPE.
Once again, this results in an excellent pre-independence fit as suggested by the average
RMSPE, which now equals 0.029, while our primary conclusions remain robust.
Finally, to gauge the statistical significance of these results, figure A2 verifies whether
a causal interpretation is warranted by their distribution. Plotting the same sequence of
population-weighted independence dividend estimates along with 95% confidence intervals,
we confirm that the per capita GDP discrepancy between NICs and their synthetic coun-
terparts are statistically indistinguishable from 0 in the pre-independence period.18 More
importantly, these graphs confirm that - irrespective of the selected sample - NICs tend
to underperform versus their synthetic versions in the entire post-independence period.
18To take the potential presence of anticipation effects into account, we redid the analysis shifting the
timing of independence to have occurred 3 years earlier, obtaining qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 3: Impact of secession in selected countries
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(d) 40% best matched cases
-2
-1
0
1
2
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 d
iv
id
en
d
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Years of independence
(e) 20% best matched cases
-2
-1
0
1
2
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 d
iv
id
en
d
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Years of independence
(f) All cases within caliper
Note: Each gray line plots the yearly log per capita GDP discrepancy between the per capita GDP
trajectory of a specific NIC and its synthetic counterpart around their declaration of independence. The
black line depicts the yearly population-weighted average gaps; the red line displays the pre- and post-
independence average gaps. The number of years before (-) or after (+) independence are indicated on
the horizontal axis. The top-left panel contains all available cases, subsequent panels include only results
of the 80, 60, 40 and 10% best matched cases in terms of their pre-independence RMSPE. The bottom
figure includes only those cases for which the pre-independence RMSPE falls within the data-driven
caliper cut-off amounting to 0.5 times the samplewide standard deviation in pre-independence RMSPE.
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3.4 Finite-sample bias correction
As noted in the introduction, one drawback of this estimation procedure lies in the ab-
sence of a systematic way to assess the degree of uncertainty surrounding synthetic control
estimates of treatment effects. In this section, we propose a finite-sample bias correction
procedure to sequentially correct for three potential sources of bias while at the same time
quantifying the ensuing degree of estimation uncertainty: (i) matching quality, which
relates to the economic comparability of NIC and synthetic NIC in absence of state frag-
mentation; (ii) simulation quality, which depends upon the extent to which synthetic NICs
adequately reproduce the counterfactual trajectories NICs would have experienced in ab-
sence of state fragmentation; and (iii) contamination effects, arising from the economic
effects of independence in other recently formed states.
3.4.1 Matching quality
First, recall that the synthetic control method critically hinges upon the close similarity
between countries in the pre-independence period to eliminate the potential bias of unob-
served heterogeneity.19 This motivates a closer inspection of the results in trimmed sam-
ples. As an alternative way to control for unobserved heterogeneity, one which avoids im-
posing arbitrary cut-offs to exclude poor-fitting cases, we develop a difference-in-difference
estimator along the lines of Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2014) to assess whether the per
capita GDP discrepancy between NICs and synthetic NICs in any given post-independence
year statistically significantly exceeds its 10-year pre-independence average value. Indeed,
as NICs are unaffected by state fragmentation in the pre-independence period by construc-
tion, the distribution of pre-independence per capita GDP discrepancies between NICs and
synthetic NICs is taken to approximate the sampling distribution of the per capita GDP
discrepancy between both emanating from their unobserved heterogeneity.
Further illustrating the rationale for this bias-correcting exercise, figure 4 plots the
year-on-year per capita GDP discrepancy between Armenia and synthetic Armenia in the
period surrounding its 1991 secession from the Soviet Union. In analogy to the Ukranian
example discussed in section 3.2, the figure suggests that the Armenian declaration of in-
dependence served to lower growth potential in the short to medium run but also remained
quite persistent over time. As can be seen in figure 4b, however, Armenia slightly underper-
forms compared to synthetic Armenia even in the pre-independence period. This suggests
that the size and compositional limitations associated with the Armenian donor pool of
potential control countries produce a synthetic counterfactual which only imperfectly ap-
proximates the economic situation of actual Armenia in absence of state fragmentation.
More specifically, the dashed line signifies that the typical pre-independence per capita
GDP discrepancy between both countries amounted to -9%.
19See equations (6A) and (7A).
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Figure 4: Unobserved heterogeneity: Armenia versus synthetic Armenia
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Note: Figure 4a plots the log per capita GDP trajectories of Armenia (full line) and synthetic Armenia (dashed
line) between 1981 and 2012; figure 4b plots the discrepancy between both trajectories during the same period. The
dashed line in the right figure visualizes the average pre-independence discrepancy between both countries.
In this light, one can reasonably expect synthetic Armenia to continue to outperform
Armenia in the post-independence period, at a rate determined by their unobserved het-
erogeneity, regardless of Armenia’s decision to secede. To correct for matching quality,
we proceed by assuming that the distribution of pre-independence outcome differences be-
tween both countries can be taken to reflect the outcome discrepancy emanating from their
unobserved heterogeneity. Figure 5a purges the per capita GDP trajectory of synthetic
Armenia from matching inaccuracies by removing this average pre-independence discrep-
ancy in the post-independence period, while figure 5b plots the resulting trend-demeaned
Armenian independence dividend trajectory. Reassuringly, the figure indicates that the
post-independence per capita GDP discrepancy remains unusually large compared to the
distribution of discrepancies typically observed in absence of state fragmentation.20 Thus,
the corrected Armenian independence dividend trajectory is unlikely to reflect unobserved
heterogeneity but measures the economic impact of secession as intended.
Figure 5: Accounting for matching quality: Armenia
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Note: Figure 5a plots the log per capita GDP trajectory of Armenia (full line) and both the uncorrected (dotted
line) and trend-demeaned (dashed line) versions of synthetic Armenia; figure 5b plots the raw (full line) and trend-
demeaned (dashed line) independence dividend trajectory, defined in equations (10A) and (1) respectively.
20The 95% confidence interval quantifies the uncertainty stemming from matching inaccuracy, where larger
variations in the observed pre-independence discrepancies increase measured uncertainty.
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To formalize this approach, denoting the weighting vector defining the synthetic coun-
terpart of NIC j by w∗ij = [w
∗
1j , . . . , w
∗
Ij ], we define the trend-demeaned independence
dividend for NIC j, s years after it declared independence as:
ˆβj,s
tDD
=
(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
raw treatment effect
−
(
T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yj,t −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,t
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
matching inaccuracy
(1)
Table A3 reports trend-demeaned independence dividend estimates for each available
NIC in our sample. Compared to the raw estimates, trend-demeaned estimates tend
to be slightly lower in absolute value. Hence, not correcting for matching quality slightly
inflates the estimated independence dividend. Nevertheless, trend-demeaned estimates are
quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to their uncorrected counterparts. A closer
inspection of the results plotted in figure A3 reveals that, irrespective of the time-horizon,
roughly 60 to 80% of NICs suffered economic costs of secession even after correcting for
matching quality, with the remaining 20 to 40% experiencing a net independence gain.
3.4.2 Simulation quality
Second, note that the confidence intervals plotted in figures A2 and 5b only express the
uncertainty associated with the magnitude of the estimated gaps, either across NICs or
relative to the pre-independence period. One additional source of uncertainty concerns
their reliability, which critically hinges on the extent to which synthetic control countries
adequately reproduce the per capita GDP trajectories NICs would have experienced in
absence of state fragmentation. To the extent that they do not, estimated independence
dividends may not only be attributed to the decision to secede but also to poor simulation
quality.21 To study the robustness of the results in this regard, we extend the placebo
test approach developed by Abadie et al. (2010) to quantify the probability of obtaining
estimates of this magnitude by pure chance. To do so, we reapply the synthetic control
method to each potential control country in a particular NIC’s donor pool.22 As the coun-
tries involved are unaffected by state breakup by construction, the resulting distribution of
‘placebo’ dividends is taken to approximate the sampling distribution of the independence
dividend estimate under the null hypothesis of a zero effect.
Reconsidering the Armenian example, figure 6 plots the actual trend-demeaned Ar-
menian independence dividends against the distribution of trend-demeand placebo gaps,
resulting from an application of the synthetic control algorithm to each of its 153 po-
tential control countries. Although placebo countries tend to under-perform somewhat
vis-a`-vis their synthetic counterparts as well, their per capita GDP trajectories track each
other much more closely, especially in the short- to medium run. Moreover, in stark con-
21In terms of our model, poor simulation quality primarily originates from differing transitory shocks or,
equivalently, cross-country residual variability, see equation (9A).
22Eliminating observations pertaining to the NIC itself in the process, to avoid contamination effects.
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trast to actual Armenia, per capita GDP discrepancies in its placebo group typically do
not react strongly, if at all, when their corresponding comparison country is assumed to
have declared independence. This underlines the capacity of the simulation procedure to
approximate the economic behavior of countries in absence of state fragmentation.
Figure 6: Trends in per capita GDP: Armenia versus placebo NICs
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Note: Figure 6a plots trend-demeaned Armenian independence dividend estimates (black line) against the trend-
demeaned placebo independence dividends pertaining to its 154 potential control countries (grey lines); figure 6b
plots the corresponding distribution of the actual (full line) and placebo (dashed line) estimates.
Nevertheless, placebo countries also have a tendency to under-perform vis-a´-vis their
synthetic counterparts. To account for simulation inaccuracies, we assume that the dis-
tribution of placebo estimates approximates the sampling distribution of independence
dividend estimates under the null hypothesis of a zero effect. Figure 7a corrects the trend-
demeaned trajectory of synthetic Armenia by also removing the typical trend-demeaned
discrepancy observed in its placebo group. Figure 7b now only find evidence of the Ar-
menian trend-demeaned independence dividend trajectory lying outside the distribution
of trend-demeaned placebo gaps in the short to medium run. The long term negative
Armenian independence dividend estimates, on the other hand, are consistent with the
null hypothesis of a zero effect and thus may merely reflect simulation inaccuracies.23
Figure 7: Accounting for matching & simulation quality: Armenia
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Note: Figure 7a plots the log per capita GDP trajectory in Armenia (full line), the uncorrected and trend-demeaned
(dotted lines) as well as the triple-difference (dashed line) versions of synthetic Armenia; figure 7b plots the raw (full
line), trend-demeaned (dotted line) and triple-difference (dashed line) independence dividend trajectory, defined in
equations (10A), (1) and (2) respectively.
23The 95% confidence interval quantifies uncertainty the stemming from matching & simulation inaccuracy,
where both larger pre-independence discrepancies and greater post-independence outcome deviations in
placebo countries increase measured uncertainty.
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Formally, indexing the control countries in NIC j’s donor pool by k ∈ [1, . . . ,Kj ], the
triple-difference estimate of the independence dividend s years after secession is given by
βˆDDDj,s =
[(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
raw treatment effect
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yj,t −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,t
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
matching inaccuracy
]
−
1
Kj
Kj∑
k 6=j
[(
yk,T0+s −
∑
i 6=k,i6=j
w∗i,kyi,T0+s
)
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yk,t −
∑
i 6=k
w∗i,kyi,t
))]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
simulation inaccuracy
(2)
Country-specific triple-difference estimates of the independence dividend are reported
in table A3. Compared to their uncorrected counterparts, triple-difference estimates of
the independence dividend also tend to be lower in absolute value. That being said, a look
at figure A3 reveals that correcting for matching as well as simulation quality does not
qualitatively affect our previous conclusions. Thus, our estimates indicate that declaring
independence tended to be costly in the long run for about 50% of the NICs in our sample
whereas only 35% of them experienced a long run independence gain.
3.4.3 Contamination effects
Third, note that the spatio-temporal clustering of state entry may give rise to spillover
effects.24 Indeed, although their respective governments may have had little influence
over them, contamination effects may explain the severe independence costs estimated
for former members of the Soviet and Yugoslav multi-state systems (see figure 11). To
study their potential relevance, we disentangle the ‘pure’ independence effect from po-
tential contamination effects by parametrically computing the ‘pure’ economic impact of
independence as the residual from a regression of a specific NIC’s triple-difference inde-
pendence dividend trajectory on the triple-difference independence dividend trajectories
of all other recently formed states. Indeed, as this residual vector is orthogonal to the
included independence dividend trajectories by construction, it serves as a conservative
estimate of the ‘pure’ economic impact of the isolated independence declaration.
Turning once again to the Armenian example, figure 8 plots the parametric decompo-
sition of its triple-difference independence dividend trajectory into a contamination effect
and the ‘pure’, residual economic impact of independence. The figure suggests that con-
tamination effects built up in the short to medium run yet remained persistently negative
in the longer run and thus partially explain the Armenian independence cost. Never-
theless, the decomposition also confirms that the pure, residual economic effect of the
Armenian independence declaration was negative in the short to medium run, suggesting
24Among other factors, contemporary state entry may affect growth potential in former country members
through trade disruptions (Head, Mayer, & Ries, 2010), collapse of international payments systems
(A˚slund, 2012) or border wars (Bates et al., 2007).
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that Armenia would have experienced a decennial per capita GDP dip irrespective of the
adverse contamination effects that can plausibly be attributed to the Soviet break-up.
Figure 8: Decomposing the net independence gain: Armenia
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Note: The figure plots the parametric decomposition of the triple-difference Armenian independence dividend
trajectory (full line) into a contamination effect (long-dashed line) and a residual effect (short-dashed line).
Conceptually, one can think of this approach as purging the observed triple-difference
Armenian per capita GDP trajectory from contamination effects by removing parametri-
cally estimated contamination effects in the post-independence period, as shown in figure
9a. Figure 9b once again indicates that the poor Armenian growth performance in the
post-independence period may be partially driven by economic effects of independence in
other recently formed states. Nevertheless, converging evidence suggests that the Arme-
nian independence declaration would have resulted in a decennial per capita GDP dip
even in the absence of further Soviet disintegration.
Figure 9: The pure economic effect of independence in Armenia
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Note: Figure 9a plots actual (dotted line) and contamination-corrected (full line) Armenian per capita GDP against
uncorrected, trend-demeaned (dotted lines) and triple-difference (dashed line) GDP per capita in synthetic Armenia;
figure 9b plots raw (full line), trend-demeaned (dotted line), triple-difference (short-dashed line) and pure (dashed
line) independence dividend trajectories defined in equations (10A), (1), (2) and (4) respectively.
Formally, to identify the contamination effects experienced by NIC j, we limit atten-
tion to NICs that became independent in a time window of 10 years around its own in-
dependence declaration. First, we regress NIC j’s triple-difference independence dividend
22
trajectory on those of the Lj other NICs. In order not to exhaust degrees of freedom
25,
we estimate a parsimonious model that selects the included contamination effects through
Efron, Hastie, Johnstone, and Tibshirani’s (2004) least angle regression algorithm:26
βˆDDDj,s = λ0 +
Lj∑
l 6=j
λlβˆ
DDD
l,s + j,s (3)
where the previous discussion clarifies that ∀l ∈ Lj : Tl ∈ (Tj − 10, . . . , Tj + 10).
Subsequently, we rely on the parametric approximation of the aggregated contami-
nation effect,
∑I
i 6=j λˆiβˆ
DDD
i,s , to estimate the pure economic impact associated with the
independence declaration of NIC j, s years after independence as
βˆpurej,s =
[(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
raw treatment effect
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yj,t −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,t
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
matching inaccuracy
]
−
Lj∑
l 6=j
λˆlβˆ
DDD
l,s︸ ︷︷ ︸
contamination effect
−
1
Kj
Kj∑
k 6=j
[(
yk,T0+s −
∑
i 6=k,i6=j
w∗i,kyi,T0+s
)
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yk,t −
∑
i6=k
w∗i,kyi,t
))]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
simulation inaccuracy
(4)
To estimate the degree of uncertainty, we bootstrap βˆpurej,s by bootstrapping (i) the
time window utilized to remove matching inaccuracies where, in each bootstrap sequence,
min t ∈ (T0 − 10, . . . , T0 − 1); (ii) the subsample of potential control countries, K ⊆ Kj ,
considered to remove simulation inaccuracies; and (iii) the subsample of other NICs,
L ⊆ Lj , included to remove contamination effects. Thus, measured uncertainty increases
in the variability of pre-independence discrepancies, post-independence outcome deviations
in placebo countries and estimates of aggregated contamination effects.
Country-specific estimates of the pure economic impact of secession, reported in table
A3, tend to have the same sign as their triple-difference counterparts while also being
slightly lower in absolute value in the short to medium run. Thus, spillover effects mainly
appear to affect the economic outlook in NICs in the first 10 post-independence years.
Figure A3 illustrates that 20% of NICs appear to have suffered a pure long run economic
independence cost while a similar fraction experienced a pure independence gain.
3.4.4 Comparison of the aggregate results
To conclude, figure 10 provides a bird’s-eye view of the implications of these bias-correction
inferential exercises by plotting the various population-weighted independence dividend
estimates discussed in this section. To adequately represent estimation uncertainty, in
each case, standard errors of the aggregate independence dividend estimates are com-
puted by block bootstrapping over countries while randomly drawing the yearly indepen-
25As the Lj concurrent trajectories may outnumber NIC j’s available independence dividend estimates.
26The least angle regression estimator is implemented by Efron et al.’s (2004) lars-command in Stata 13.1.
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dence dividend estimates from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation as
determined by the corresponding country-level independence dividend estimates in each
iteration of the bootstrap.27 Thus, measured uncertainty increases in the variability of in-
dependence dividend estimates across (populous) NICs and estimation uncertainty in the
country-specific independence dividend estimates as described in the previous subsections.
Irrespective of the estimator, there is a clear pattern of negative independence div-
idends in the short to medium run while cross-country heterogeneity obscures a clear
assessment of the long run independence payoff. The raw estimates seem more sensitive
to simulation than to matching inaccuracy, as correcting for simulation quality yields the
most pronounced upward correction. There is no strong evidence that contamination ef-
fects meaningfully affected growth potential in the full sample, as the triple-difference
and pure independence dividend estimates largely coincide. Interestingly, estimates of
the pure economic impact of secession are fairly stable across bootstrap iterations and do
not depend strongly on the time window considered to remove matching inaccuracy, the
available potential control countries or the potential contamination effects considered.
27 More specifically, note that equation (2) allows us to estimate both the triple-difference estimate of
the independence dividend of NIC i in its sth post-independence year, βˆDDDi,s , as well as the associated
standard error, which we denote by σˆDDDi,s . Therefore, when bootstrapping the population-weighted
triple-difference independence dividend, in any bootstrap iteration including NIC i, we draw βDDDi,s ∼
N
(
βˆDDDi,s ,
(
σˆDDDi,s
)2)
to accurately capture estimation uncertainty of the estimate for βDDDi,s .
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Figure 10: Semi-parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession
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Note: The figure plots the yearly average uncorrected synthetic control estimates of the independence dividend (hollow dots), as defined in equation (10A), against
the corresponding trend difference-in-difference (triangles), triple-difference (squares) and pure (diamonds) estimates related to equations (10A), (1), (2) and (4).
Block-bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are based on 500 iterations and are robust against heteroskedasticity, serial correlation at the country level and estimation
uncertainty in individual independence dividend estimates. The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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3.5 Selected results
To put more empirical flesh on the bones, figure 11 supplements the large-scale econometric
analysis of the previous sections by highlighting the results pertaining to a number of
historical instances of state fragmentation and connecting them to the existing literature on
this topic. More specifically, the figure characterizes the economic consequences associated
with the disintegration of the Belgian, British, French and Portuguese colonial empires,
comparing these with the implied economic effects stemming from the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and - most recently - Czechoslovakia.
Recall that the identity of the mother country is thought to play an important role in
explaining cross-country heterogeneity in the economic impact of secession, see section 1.
In this regard, it is often argued that former British colonies prospered relative to their
French, Spanish, Portuguese and Belgian counterparts because the British left behind bet-
ter institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002) and were more successful in educating their
dependents (Grier, 1999). Interestingly, our results are largely consistent with this story
and suggest that, in sharp contrast to NICs with other colonial heritages, former British
colonies did not tend to suffer adverse economic consequences as a result of becoming inde-
pendent and even enjoyed an independence gain of around 10% in the medium run. More
surprisingly, although Belgian and Portuguese dominations are often considered the most
detrimental and exploitative (Bertocchi & Canova, 2002), only former Belgian colonies
appear to have suffered adverse economic consequences of colonial demise in the form of
an increasing reduction in per capita GDP that amounted to 50% of potential per capita
GDP in the 30th post-independence year. Similarly, former French colonies appear to have
suffered a persistent independence cost of around 20% in per capita GDP terms.
In the same vein, Roland (2002), Svejnar (2002) and Fidrmuc (2003) maintain that
the extent of state capture and rent-seeking was more pervasive in the Soviet Union than
in other Eastern and Central European countries and that these differential initial condi-
tions, often proxied by the distance from Western Europe, go a long way in explaining the
under-performance of former Soviet states vis-a´-vis other NICs in the region. Furthermore,
they argue that this mechanism may have been amplified by differential prospects of EU
membership, which enhanced incentives for law enforcement and protection of property
rights in potential member states. Our results are testimony to this, indicating that the
group of former Soviet members initially suffered the most adverse effects of state breakup.
In comparison, the Yugoslavian successor states seem initially less affected by state frag-
mentation while the economic costs associated with the Czechoslovakian ‘Velvet Divorce’
were both more modest and much less persistent. However, the available estimates also
suggest that the violent Yugoslavian disintegration entailed persistent adverse economic
consequences for the earliest breakaway regions.
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Figure 11: Triple-difference estimates: historical instances of state fragmentation
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Note: The figures plot yearly, triple-difference estimates of the independence dividend trajectories associated with selected
historical instances of state fragmentation. Each gray line plots the trajectory of a specific former member state; the black lines
depict the aggregate independence dividend trajectory for each independence wave; the dashed lines depict the 95% confidence
interval. Block-bootstrapped confidence intervals are based on 500 iterations and are robust against heteroskedasticity, serial
correlation at the country level and estimation uncertainty in individual independence dividend estimates. The number of years
after independence are indicated on the horizontal axis. 27
3.6 Robustness results
3.6.1 Accounting for transition costs
One remaining worry with the independence dividend estimates in figures 11e through
11g is that they may be partially driven by the costs these NICs experienced from their
transition from planned to market economies, since these transition costs could have mate-
rialized irrespective of their choices to secede. Indeed, as the transition process temporally
coincided with the independence declarations of the countries involved, transition costs
may at least partially explain the severe independence costs estimated for the breakup
of the former Soviet, Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian states. To study their potential rele-
vance, we aim to disentangle the independence effect from these transition costs by semi-
parametrically computing transition costs in a group of ‘established’ transition countries,
namely those transition countries that did not recently declare independence, and subse-
quently subtracting these from the independence dividend estimates pertaining to newly
formed transition countries. To the extent that the distribution of transition costs in these
established transition countries can be taken to reflect the transition costs that would have
been experienced by the new transition countries in our sample, this approach allows us
to purge the relevant independence dividend estimates from transition costs.
Figure 12a demonstrates this reasoning by reconsidering the Ukrainian example from
section 3.2 and compares the synthetic control estimates for the per capita GDP dis-
crepancy between Ukraine and its synthetic counterpart in the 20-year period around its
declaration of independence with the contemporary per capita GDP discrepancies observed
in the five established transition countries mentioned in Roland (2000), i.e. Albania, Bul-
garia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. As can be seen, all these established transition
countries also started to underperform with respect to their synthetic counterparts de-
spite not having declared independence in 1991. More specifically, these results suggests
that they effectively incurred a persistent transition cost of around 20% to 40% in per
capita GDP terms. To account for the transition costs that would also be experienced by
Ukraine absent secession, we assume that the distribution of estimated transition costs
in these five established transition countries can be taken to approximate the portion of
the per capita GDP discrepancy between Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine that stems from
Ukraine’s transition process towards a market economy.
More specifically, figure 12b corrects the triple-differenced trajectory of synthetic Ukraine
by also removing the typical triple-differenced discrepancy observed in the group of es-
tablished transition countries. Doing so, figure 12c nevertheless indicates that the post-
independence per capita GDP discrepancy between Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine remains
unusually negative compared to the contemporary distribution of discrepancies observed
in established transition countries. Moreover, figure 12c also shows that correcting the
Ukrainian triple-differenced independence dividends for the discrepancy that can reason-
ably be attributed to transition costs only results in a modest upward revision of its inde-
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pendence dividend trajectory, suggesting that the bulk of Ukraine’s underperformance in
the post-independence period stems from its independence declaration or, in other words,
that only a small part of it appears to be driven by transition costs.
Generalizing this approach, denote the contemporary transition countries in newly
formed transition country j’s donor pool by m ∈ [1, . . . ,Mj ] and define the quadruple-
difference estimate of its independence dividend in the sth post-independence year as
βˆpurej,s =
[(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
raw treatment effect
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yj,t −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,t
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
matching inaccuracy
]
−
1
Mj
Mj∑
m 6=j
[(
ym,T0+s −
∑
i 6=m,i 6=j
w∗i,myi,T0+s
)
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
ym,t −
∑
i 6=m
w∗i,myi,t
))]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
transition cost
−
1
Kj
Kj∑
k 6=j
[(
yk,T0+s −
∑
i 6=k,i6=j
w∗i,kyi,T0+s
)
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yk,t −
∑
i6=k
w∗i,kyi,t
))]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
simulation inaccuracy
(5)
Figure 12d plots the aggregate triple-differenced yearly independence dividend es-
timates for all newly formed transition countries in our sample, namely the successor
states to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and compares these with their
quadruple-differenced counterparts. As can be seen, purging the triple-differenced inde-
pendence dividends from discrepancies that can plausibly be attributed to the transition
process results in a modest upward revision of the independence dividend. Nevertheless,
as the figure also shows, most of the under-performance of these newly formed transition
countries can be reasonably attributed to their decision to declare independence, such that
our prior conclusions remain qualitatively unaffected. These findings are consistent with
the idea that secessions are more disruptive in economic terms within planned economies,
due to the collapse of the integrated economic space and the severing of supply chains as
well as the weakness of the institutions in their constituent parts.
For completeness, figure A4 plots the quadruple-differenced versions of the estimated
independence dividend trajectories in figure 11 while table A4 compares the country-
specific quadruple-differenced independence dividends of the newly formed transition coun-
tries in our sample with their triple-differenced counterparts.
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Figure 12: Accounting for transition costs
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(c) The economic impact of secession (Ukraine)
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(d) Semi-parametric estimates of the independence dividend: transition countries
Note: Figure 12a plots triple-difference Ukrainian independence dividend estimates (black line) against the triple-difference independence dividends pertaining to five established transition countries (grey lines)
along with their 95% confidence intervals (blue dashed lines). Figure 12b plots the log per capita GDP trajectory in Ukraine (full line), the uncorrected , trend-demeaned and triple-difference (dotted lines) as
well as the quadruple-difference (dashed line) versions of synthetic Ukraine; figure 12c plots the raw (full line), trend-demeaned and triple-difference (dotted line) as well as the quadruple-difference (full line)
independence dividend trajectories that are respectively defined in equations (10A), (1), (2) and (5). Figure 12d plots the yearly population-weighted triple-difference (hollow circles) and quadruple-difference (full
circles) estimates of the independence dividend in newly formed transition countries, as outlined in equations (2) and (5). Block-bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are based on 500 iterations and are robust
against heteroskedasticity, serial correlation at the country level and estimation uncertainty in individual independence dividend estimates. Years of independence are indicated on the horizontal axis.
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3.6.2 Additional robustness checks
Finally, figure A5 briefly reports the results of three additional robustness checks. First,
one additional worry may be that the lack of spatial constraints on the composition of
the sample of potential control countries makes the results susceptible to differences in
regional development. Although this risk should be mitigated by constructing counterfac-
tual countries based on the similarity of (the drivers of) their economic performance in
the ten-year period preceding their independence declaration, we also redid the analysis
imposing a spatial constraint limiting the sample of potential control countries to those
countries with an intercapital distance of maximally 2000 km to the NIC under consid-
eration. We find that the estimated net independence gain becomes even more negative.
More specifically, comparing the economic performance of newly formed states with com-
parable economies that are located in direct geographical proximity suggests that declaring
independence lowers per capita GDP by an estimated 50%, and quite persistently so.
An opposite concern might be that allowing nearby countries to serve as potential
controls reduces the credibility of the stable unit treatment value assumption, since it is
more likely that any economic effects of independence will spill over to nearby countries,
making it tenuous to maintain that the group of control countries is itself unaffected by
the independence declaration. To verify the relevance of this concern, we also redid the
analysis requiring an intercapital distance of minimally 4000 km to be included in the pool
of potential control countries. As doing so once again yields highly similar results, we find
no empirical evidence of severe violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption.
Similarly, a third concern may be that the only restriction imposed on the composition
of the sample of potential control countries, namely that NICs cannot serve as potential
control countries in the first 10 years after independence, conflicts with our finding of a
persistent independence effect. As a result, there might be a perceived risk of counterfac-
tual trajectories being contaminated with the effects of independence stemming from their
constituent parts. Although this contamination risk should also be mitigated by condi-
tioning inclusion in the group of control countries on the comparability of economic growth
performances in the immediate pre-independence period, we nevertheless re-estimated our
baseline specification imposing a more stringent temporal constraint requiring potential
control countries to be independent for at least 30 years at the time that the NIC under
consideration became independent. Doing so, however, yields highly comparable indepen-
dence dividend estimates which once again suggest slightly more adverse independence
effects in the long run. At face value, these robustness results thus suggest that our
baseline results offer a lower bound for the true average independence cost in our sample.
Finally, to demonstrate that these findings appear to hold irrespective of the estimation
procedure employed, Reynaerts and Vanschoonbeek (2016) also formulate a parametric
approach to estimate the independence payoff, obtaining similar results.
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4 Two-step estimates of the determinants of the indepen-
dence dividend
So far, our findings suggest that the independence dividend tends to be substantial, neg-
ative and fairly persistent. Yet, there also is considerable heterogeneity in the economic
impact of secession across countries and time. From a policy perspective, one lingering
issue concerns understanding the economic channels through which secessionist processes
affect growth potential in NICs. Building on prior results, this final extension proposes a
two-step approach to shed some light on the primary economic channels determining both
the sign as well as the magnitude of country-specific independence payoffs. After outlining
the estimation strategy, we present the baseline results along with some robustness checks.
4.1 Estimation strategy
To evaluate the various channels through which the decision to secede might affect growth
potential, we refine the methodology put forward by Campos et al. (2014) and regress
the semi-parametric independence dividend estimates on several potential determinants.
Doing so, we limit our attention to the first 30 years following secession and consider the
potential channels most commonly cited in the theoretical literature, see section 1: the
presence of (dis)economies of scale, as proxied by population size and trade openness; the
impact of military conflict, as captured by the per capita number of battle deaths; the
relevance of ongoing processes of democratization, incarnated in an index of democracy;
and the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty, as reflected in a financial crisis dummy
indicating known episodes of debt and/or banking crises.
In determining the relative importance of these potential determinants, a first compli-
cation is that the values of these growth determinants may not be perfectly comparable
over time. The gradual liberalization of trade, for instance, makes it likely that more
recent NICs also benefit from more trade opportunities, obscuring a clear definition of
trade openness. To improve intertemporal comparability, we normalize each continuous
predictor by dividing it by its population-weighted sample-average value in each year. A
second obvious difficulty is that the interpretation of the regression coefficients is sensitive
to the scale of the inputs. Therefore, in a subsequent step, all normalized continuous
predictor variables are standardized to convert them to a common scale.28,29 Addition-
ally, to take into account that global patterns in trade liberalization may have gradually
reduced the economic cost of secession, in addition to region, mother country and years-of-
independence dummies, all specifications also include (calendar) year dummies. Finally,
to control for the potential biases stemming from poor matching and simulation quality,
28Dummy variables remain unchanged since their coefficients can already be interpreted directly.
29As noted by Schielzeth (2010), there has been some controversy about this approach to measure the
relative importance of predictor variables since there is no unique way to partition the variation in the
dependent variable when predictor variables are correlated. Firth (1998) provides a more comprehensive
overview of the relevant literature.
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we also include as control variables both the average per capita GDP discrepancy observed
in the last 10 years prior to independence as well as the average contemporary placebo
independence dividend estimated in the group of potential control countries.
More specifically, denoting the estimated net gain of independence of NIC i located in
region r pertaining to the sth post-independence year, which coincides with calendar year
t, by βˆi,r,t,s, we estimate the following second-step regression model:
βˆi,r,t,s = α1 + α2β¯i + α3β¯
placebo
i,r,t,s + λXi,r,t,s + ηs + δr + µt + φm + i,r,t,s (6)
where β¯i =
1
10
∑T0−1
t=T0−10 βˆi,t denotes the average per capita GDP discrepancy between
NIC i and its synthetic version in the pre-independence period; β¯placeboi,r,t,s =
1
Ki
∑
j 6=i βˆj,r,t,s
captures the average contemporary placebo dividend estimate in NIC i’s group of Ki po-
tential control countries; Xi,r,t,s denotes the (1×X) vector of normalized and standardized
predictors of the independence dividend; ηs captures the S years-of-independence fixed ef-
fects; δr denotes the R region fixed effects; µt contains the T year fixed effects; φm is a
dummy identifying the mother country of each NIC i; and the error term, i,r,t,s, collects
all random, transitory shocks to the independence dividend. Note that the coefficients
collected in λ reflect the standard deviation elasticity of the independence dividend with
respect to each of its normalized predictors, such that larger coefficients identify more in-
fluential predictors. In this light, it makes sense to define the relative importance of each
normalized predictor x ∈ X, λx, as the expected percentage change in the independence
dividend associated with its standard deviation increase.
One final concern is related to the fact that the dependent variable is itself an esti-
mate, implying that OLS-estimation may produce underestimated standard errors (Lewis
& Linzer, 2005). To adequately represent first-stage estimation uncertainty, standard er-
rors are computed by a bootstrapping procedure that comprises re-sampling over the set of
independence dividends with replacement while randomly drawing the values of the depen-
dent variable from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to those
of the corresponding first-step independence dividend estimates in each subsequent itera-
tion of the bootstrap.30 As an alternative, since the standard errors from the estimated
dependent variable are known, we also estimate an ‘estimated dependent variable’-model
where consistent standard errors are computed using the feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS) weighting method proposed by Lewis and Linzer (2005, p. 351-352). The ad-
vantage of the latter method is that it gives more weight to more precisely estimated
independence dividends, thereby correcting for the differential precision in the first-step
estimation, at the cost of rendering the interpretation of the coefficients more ambiguous.
30See also footnote 27.
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4.2 Baseline results
Table 4 summarizes the results of this exercise relying on the most conservative triple-
difference estimates of the independence dividend, reporting the results separately for both
standard error estimation procedures outlined in the previous subsection. As expected, one
common pattern is the significant and positive persistence in per capita GDP discrepancies.
Thus, the finding that NICs experiencing large per capita GDP discrepancies vis-a´-vis
their synthetic versions during the pre-independence period tend to continue doing so
after becoming independent confirms the importance of controlling for matching quality
in our estimation model. Similarly, the existence of a negative relation between estimated
independence dividends in NICs and the average placebo independence dividend estimate
points to the importance of explicitly controlling for simulation quality, though the FGLS
standard errors suggest that the issue of simulation inaccuracy is not very significant.
More importantly, columns (1a) and (1b) provide a first, rudimentary glance into the
economic mechanisms behind our empirical findings. Several explanations to account for
the observed variation in the estimated net gains of secession are confirmed. First, we
obtain positive estimates for the effect of trade openness, suggesting that unusually trade
open NICs have a clear ceteris paribus tendency to economically outperform their more
protectionist counterparts during the first 30 years of independence in our sample. This
corroborates previous theoretical findings which suggest that trade openness counteracts
the adverse effects of decreased domestic market size. Secondly, all else equal, the adverse
effects of declaring independence appear to be decreasing in the population size of the
newly formed state. In line with the endogenous growth literature, we thus find evidence
that more populous NICs tend to economically outperform their less-populated counter-
parts, pointing to the relevance of economies of scale. Third, democratization appears as
another channel through which newly formed states can reduce the adverse economic ef-
fects associated with their decision to secede, resonating with prior empirical evidence that
democracy does cause growth, to paraphrase Acemoglu, Suresh, Restrepo, and Robinson
(2014). Fourth, as suggested by the political science literature, we also find evidence that
post-independence growth prospects worsen if independence declarations are followed by
military violence or financial crises, although the latter effect cannot be precisely estimated
in the FGLS-regression. Finally, a quick comparison of the coefficient values suggests that
trade openness is the strongest predictor of post-independence economic performance in
our sample, identifying the ability to maintain trade relations as the most imperative
channel to improve economic growth prospects in newly formed states.
Columns (2a) and (2b) dig a little deeper by also including initial per capita GDP as a
crude way to control for omitted variable bias, by accounting for the level of economic de-
velopment. Perhaps surprisingly, although the results indicate that more developed NICs
experience slightly lower independence costs, the effect of the initial economic situation
is so small that it can not be precisely estimated through FGLS. More importantly, our
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previous findings are unaffected by explicitly controlling for economic development.
Subsequently, columns (3a) and (3b) verify Qvortrup’s (2014) claim that declaring
independence by referendum might be particularly conducive to peaceful political settle-
ments, such that successful independence referendums potentially mitigate at least some
of the economic costs of secession. To do so, we add a dummy variable indicating the
occurrence of a successful independence referendum prior to the official declaration of
independence. We find some evidence that these procedural aspects may matter, as the
coefficient of the referendum-dummy is positive, statistically significant and comparatively
large in the bootstrapped model. Our previous findings once again remain unaltered.
Columns (4a) and (4b), finally, demonstrate how these findings also appear robust to
the inclusion of a battery of fixed effects, by adding dummy variables indicating member-
ship to the EU, the OPEC, the NATO, the African Union and ASEAN to the previous
model. Interestingly, we find evidence that oil-producing countries faced lower indepen-
dence costs in both models, suggesting that the immovability of natural resources can give
a slight economic edge to the economic outlooks of aspirant states endowed with them.
It may be useful to compare these results with the various fixed effects in equation (6).
To do so, figure A6 summarizes the estimated year fixed effects, years-of-independence
fixed effects, region fixed effects and the estimated relevance of the identity of the mother
country. First of all, in line with the existing literature, figure A6a finds evidence of
global trade liberalization gradually lowering the economic costs of independence as there
is a clear and persistent upward trend in the estimated year fixed effects, which might
co-explain the recent surge in separatism throughout the world. Additionally, figure A6b
shows that independence dividends, all else equal, do not appear to slowly erode but on the
contrary have a tendency to grow more negative over time. Figure A6c shows that newly
formed states in the region of Europe & Central Asia have a clear tendency to outperform
NICs in other parts of the world, potentially as a result of the growth-enhacing effects of
(the requirements to gain access to) the European internal market. Finally, figure A6d
suggest that the decolonization had less adverse economic effects than the more recent
break-ups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, suggesting that there may
have been economic gains associated with the elimination of colonial drain.
In conclusion, we find consistent evidence across a variety of estimation models that the
adverse effects of independence are decreasing in the population size of newly formed states
and that they are also mitigated when opening up to trade or building more democratic in-
stitutions. Nevertheless, independence costs also unambiguously appear to increase in the
incidence of military violence in the post-independence period. Trade openness emerges
as the strongest predictor of post-independence economic performance in all these speci-
fiactions, underscoring the prevalence of this topic in many contemporary independence
discussions. We fail to find clear-cut cross-model evidence on the relevance of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and the economic desirability of declaring independence by referendum.
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Table 4: Determinants of the independence dividend
Bootstrap Feasible Generalized Least Squares
Channel (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
β¯ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ -0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
β¯placebo -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Trade openness 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Population size 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracy 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial crisis -0.03∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Battle deaths -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial per capita GDP 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 -0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Referendum dummy 0.08∗∗ 0.07∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.06
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
EU dummy 0.15∗∗ -0.03
(0.09) (0.10)
OPEC dummy 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
NATO dummy -0.14∗∗ -0.09
(0.09) (0.10)
African Union dummy -0.45∗∗∗ -0.05
(0.07) (0.12)
ASEAN dummy 0.34∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.09) (0.10)
Observations [# countries] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77]
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years-of-independence dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bootstrap iterations 500 500 500 500 . . . .
Note: This table reports estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation (6), of several
determinants of the triple-difference independence dividend, as defined in equation (2). The first 4 columns
report bootstrapped standard errors, based on 500 iterations and robust against estimation uncertainty in
the first-step independence dividend estimates. The last 4 columns report standard errors computed by
the feasible generalized least squares method proposed by Lewis and Linzer (2005, p. 351-352).
4.3 Robustness results
One important limitation with the relative importance estimates in the previous section
is that they ignore the potential endogeneity between estimated treatment effects (in
this case, the estimated independence dividends) and their potential determinants. More
specifically, if economic agents in NICs possess prior knowledge on any efficiency gains that
are associated with the independence declaration at the time that economically relevant
decisions are made, this might lead to endogeneity bias if these decisions are partially
determined by prior beliefs about the (unobserved) efficiency gain of independence. To
address the endogeneity issue, we borrow and adapt an estimator from the total factor
productivity literature to parametrically proxy and control for the unobserved efficiency
gain of independence, based on the assumption that fixed capital investment decisions of
NICs contain useful information on the (perceived) efficiency gain of independence.
36
Although the technical details are relegated to appendix C, the main idea is to fol-
low Olley and Pakes (1996) in assuming that fixed capital investments take time before
they augment the existing capital stock, implying that both national fixed capital stocks
(Ki,r,t,s) and fixed capital investments (Ii,r,t,s) can function as a signal for the perceived
efficiency gain of independence in year t, as higher expected efficiency gains should make it
more profitable to increase the (future) fixed capital stock. This, in turn, suggests that we
can control for the endogeneity concern by adding a so-called control function to regression
equation (6), that proxies for the perceived efficiency gain of independence in NIC i in year
t through a polynomial of order O in Ki,r,t,s and Ii,r,t,s.
31 The underlying identification
assumption is that, conditional on contemporary values of the fixed capital stock, national
fixed capital investment demand can serve as a good proxy for the perceived efficiency
gain of independence such that its inclusion should alleviate simultaneity concerns.
Table 5 reports the corresponding endogeneity-robust estimates for the relative im-
portance of the potential determinants of the triple-difference independence dividends, in
analogy to the estimation results reported in table 4.32 Surprisingly, we find little evidence
for the presence of endogeneity bias as most endogeneity-robust coefficients do not statis-
tically significantly differ from their baseline counterparts. Nevertheless, we find moderate
evidence that one potential channel might be endogenous. More specifically, the estimated
favorable impact of trade openness shrinks considerably once we parametrically control
for the unobserved efficiency gain of independence. This finding is consistent with the
conjecture that trade openness is mostly a byproduct of growth-enhancing independence
declarations, rather than the other way around.
Reassuringly, the endogeneity-robust results nevertheless confirm that our baseline
findings seem qualitatively robust to endogeneity. Interesingly, the four channels of trade
openness, population size, democracy and military conflict that emerge as the most con-
sistent predictors of the independence dividend all attain comparable estimated relative
importance across the (unweighted) bootstrapped endogeneity-robust estimation models.
Finally, tables A5 through A7 also verify the sensitivity of the results with respect to
the specific first-step estimation procedure utilized to estimate the independence dividend,
by sequentially replacing the triple-difference independence dividend estimates with their
raw, trend-demeaned and placebo-demeaned counterparts in our baseline regression. Once
again, we obtain broadly similar results, such that our findings seem to hold irrespective
of the first-step estimation procedure utilized to estimate the independence dividend.
31The empirical application relies on a second order polynomial, such that O = 2. Data on gross fixed
capital, gross fixed capital formation and the yearly depreciation rate of fixed capital are derived from
Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) and World Bank (2016) - see appendix A.
32Note that the sample size differs between the baseline and robustness models, due to the large number of
missing observations for fixed capital (formation) necessary to implement the control function approach.
Therefore, strictly speaking, there is no direct comparison between the baseline and endogeneity-robust
results as any discrepancy could be either due to the inclusion of the control function, the composition
of the estimation sample, or both. We ignore this slight complication in the text.
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Table 5: Endogeneity-robust determinants of the independence dividend
Bootstrap Feasible Generalized Least Squares
Channel (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
β¯ -0.00∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
β¯placebo -0.06∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.00∗∗ 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Trade openness 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Population size 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Democracy 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial crisis -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.15∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Battle deaths -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial per capita GDP 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Referendum dummy 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ -0.05 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
EU dummy 0.11∗∗ 0.16
(0.08) (0.14)
OPEC dummy 0.33∗∗∗ -0.09
(0.08) (0.19)
NATO dummy -0.09∗∗ -0.21
(0.09) (0.14)
African Union dummy -0.54∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗
(0.08) (0.18)
ASEAN dummy -0.04∗∗ -0.03
(0.07) (0.12)
Observations [# countries] 1568 [57] 1568 [57] 1568 [57] 1568 [57] 1568 [57] 1568 [57] 1568 [57] 1568 [57]
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.48
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years-of-independence dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control function [O = 2] yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bootstrap iterations 500 500 500 500 . . . .
Note: This table reports estimates of the relative importance of several determinants of the triple-difference
independence dividend using the control function approach summarized in equation (17A). As explained
in appendix C.1, all estimation models contain a second-order polynomial in fixed capital stocks and gross
fixed capital formation, both expressed as shares of GDP. The first 4 columns report bootstrapped standard
errors, based on 500 iterations and robust against estimation uncertainty in the first-step independence
dividend estimates. The last 4 columns report standard errors computed by the feasible generalized least
squares estimated-dependent-variable method proposed by Lewis and Linzer (2005, p. 351-352).
5 Conclusion
In tandem with the worldwide surge in separatism, independence movements increasingly
tend to defend their cause based on economic considerations. However, whether or not
there are economic benefits from declaring independence remains largely unexplored. This
study is the first to examine the economic impact of secession for a broad sample of newly
independent countries, focusing on a large time period covering the years 1950 to 2016.
Relying on a semi-parametric estimation strategy to control for the confounding ef-
fects of past GDP dynamics, anticipation effects, unobserved heterogeneity between newly
formed and more established states, model uncertainty as well as effect heterogeneity, we
present robust evidence that secession historically hampered economic growth potential.
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Our central results suggest that the decision to secede reduced per capita GDP anywhere
between 20% and 40% in the NICs in our sample. From a methodological perspective, we
develop a novel quadruple-difference procedure that sequentially accounts for matching
quality, simulation quality and contamination effects, providing informative statistical in-
ference on the reliability of synthetic control estimates of treatment effects. Applying this
procedure, we confirm the existence of a statistically significant negative independence
dividend in the short to medium run, with cross-country heterogeneity slighlty obscuring
the average long-run impact of independence. Moreover, a robustness check finds that
the economic underperformance of newly formed transition countries appears to be in
large part driven by their independence declaration and not by the transition process,
suggesting that the existing literature may have overestimated transition costs.
A more speculative second part then tries to move beyond mere description and looks
for empirical evidence of more general lessons that can be learned. We develop a two-step
estimator to verify to what extent the estimated independence dividends of the NICs in our
sample meaningfully correlate with a number of their underlying characteristics. In line
with much of the existing literature, we find tentative evidence that the adverse effects of
independence decrease in population size, suggesting that the independence in our sample
are partially driven by the losses in economies of scale which newly formed states inevitably
incur when declaring independence. Nevertheless, we also find evidence that NICs can
mitigate at least some of the adverse effects of declaring independence by opening up
to trade, improving democratic institutions and avoiding violent secession. Interestingly,
trade openness often emerges as the strongest predictor of post-independence economic
performance, in line with prevalence of this topic in many contemporary independence
debates. We fail to find clear-cut evidence on the relevance of macroeconomic uncertainty
and the economic desirability of declaring independence by referendum. A robustness
check combines both parametric and semi-parametric techniques to control for endogeneity
and demonstrates the stability of these results.
In light of these findings, two additional future research questions naturally arise. First,
do these results generalize to other regions contemplating independence today? Indeed,
since we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, extrapolation to contem-
porary and future aspirant countries may be problematic to the extent that they differ
non-trivially from the historical cases of state fragmentation considered in this analysis.33
Second, do these findings generalize to the non-economic spectrum? This also remains
an open question, as independence may come with compensating political (Alesina &
Spolaore, 1997, 2003), re-distributional (Bolton & Roland, 1997) or other effects.
33Note, for instance, that there are no historical examples of highly economically developed regions declar-
ing independence from their mother countries, such that it remains unclear what the historical experience
can teach us about contemporary cases such as Scotland or Catalonia. Nevertheless, the two-step ap-
proach developed in section 4 is a first attempt to offer some guidance, by at least verifying to what
extent historical patterns in the estimated independence dividends conform to theoretical expectations.
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A Data construction and sources
In order to ensure a dataset that is as complete as possible, we draw on a wide variety
of data sources to construct several variables used in the empirical analysis. This section
describes in more detail the variable-specific data manipulation procedure utilized to con-
struct these variables. Table A1 summarizes the data sources and construction for the
main variables of interest (indicated by ♦) while also reporting some diagnostics.
GDP per capita (baseline)♦: To construct our baseline estimates of the country-specific
per capita GDP trajectories, we rely on a third-order polynomial approximation proce-
dure that builds on Fearon and Laitin (2003a). We depart from the estimates for per
capita GDP measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars and reported by The Madison Project
(2017). This series starts in 1950 and ends in 2010 and provides 8477 (63.2%) of our 13405
country years. Subsequently, we maximally extend these estimates forward to 2016 and
backwards to 1960 using the growth rate of real per capita GDP provided by the World
Bank (2016), thereby adding another 2651 (19.8%) country-year observations. Afterward,
we remove 16 isolated country-year observations pertaining to the pre-independence sit-
uation in the group of former Soviet states. In a next step, we regress these baseline log
per capita GDP estimates on log per capita CO2 emissions, as reported by the World
Resources Institute (2015), a vector of year dummies, a region dummy for each of the
seven regions distinguished by the World Bank (2016), their squared and cubic values as
well as all possible interactions up to the third order. We then use the growth rate of the
predicted per capita GDP trajectories to maximally extend the baseline series forward and
backwards, adding another 869 (6.5%) observations.34 Data on the country-specific emis-
sion levels of CO2 are available between 1950 and 2012 and, in itself, these correlate fairly
strongly with the baseline per capita income estimates, at 0.83 for their 10050 common
observations. That being said, with a correlation coefficient of 0.89, predicted per capita
GDP levels correlate even more strongly with the baseline estimates. Finally, evaluating
this least squares third-order polynomial model’s predictive accuracy on an observation-
by-prediction basis, we find that 55% of the baseline log per capita GDP observations fall
within the 99% confidence intervals of their predicted counterparts. Although this indi-
cates a fairly good match between the model’s data-generating process and our reference
series, this further motivates extending the reference data by relying on the growth rates
implied in these alternative predictions, rather than the predicted values themselves.
In order to further extend the existing data series, we repeat this exercise by sequen-
tially using information on log per capita CO2 emissions contained in World Bank (2016)
and primary energy consumption as reported by Correlates of War Project (2012). The
World Bank (2016) data on CO2 emissions runs from 1960-2016 and also shows a strong
34There remain several countries lacking any income estimates in the baseline series, but for which data
on the level of CO2 emissions are available. For these countries, we use the predicted per capita GDP
trajectories instead.
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correlation with baseline log per capita GDP (0.83 for their 8840 common observations).
The Correlates of War Project (2012) data on primary energy consumption runs from
1816-2012 and shows a moderately positive correlation with baseline log per capita GDP
(0.66 for their 8802 common observations). Nevertheless, the third-order polynomial pre-
dicted per capita GDP trajectories once again correlate even more strongly with their
baseline counterparts, yielding a correlation coefficient of respectively 0.89 and 0.85, while
the predictive accuracy of these models respectively attains 54% and 58%. Once again us-
ing the growth rates of predicted real per capita GDP to further extend the existing series
forward and backwards adds another 361 (2.69%) observations for each of both sources.
The remaining 687 (5.1%) country-year observations remain missing.35
GDP per capita (alternative)♦: In order to make sure that our findings are not driven
by the data construction process, we also construct alternative per capita GDP estimates.
To do so, we synthetize a wide variety of data sources containing information on country-
specific levels of real per capita GDP. More specifically, we consider the information in
Barro and Lee (1994); Heston, Summers, and Aten (1994); The Madison Project (2017);
Feenstra et al. (2015); The Conference Board (2015); World Bank (2016).
To derive our alternative per capita GDP trajectory, we apply the following so-called
regular data construction procedure: (i) linearly interpolate missing observations in all
available data sources, (ii) selecting the most complete source (i.e. the source with the
most country-year observations) as the baseline series. Subsequently, (iii) from the al-
ternative data sources, select the dataset for which the overlapping path is most strongly
correlated with that of the base series and (iv) use the variation in the alternative source
to approximate as much missing values in the base series as possible. First, if the non-
overlapping observations in the alternative source pertain to a country already appearing
in the base series, use the growth rates in the alternative source to maximally extend the
base series forward and backwards. Second, if the non-overlapping observations in the
alternative data source pertain to a country not covered in the base series, express its per
capita GDP relative to that of the United States to approximate missing observations in
the base series. Finally, (v) repeat steps (iii)-(v) for each remaining data source.
Table A1, then, summarizes the percentage contribution of each data source to the
total number of observations as well as the correlation with the base series. Interestingly,
the correlation between the common 11892 baseline and alternative per capita GDP esti-
mates equals 0.96, giving further credence to our polynomial approximation approach to
construct our baseline estimates. Unsurprisingly, our empirical results are not sensitive
to which measure of economic performance we use. Therefore, to economize on space,
further results pertaining to the alternative per capita GDP estimates are not reported.
Population♦: Data on the evolution of country-specific population size between 1950
35In each data source, we only rely on non-zero observations and treat zero observations as missing.
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and 2015 are obtained from Barro and Lee (1994); Heston et al. (1994); The Madison
Project (2017); CLIO Infra (2015); Feenstra et al. (2015); United Nations Population Di-
vision (2015); World Bank (2016). Aggregation across datasets is obtained by applying
the regular data construction procedure outlined earlier. Doing so, our consolidated indi-
cator of population size is constructed by: (i) linearly interpolating missing observations
in all data sources; (ii) selecting the most complete as the baseline series; (iii) selecting
the alternative dataset for which the overlapping path is most strongly correlated with
that of the base series; (iv) using the variation in the alternative source to approximate
as much missing values in the base series as possible; and (v) repeating steps (iii)-(v) for
each remaining data source. As the correlation between all these different sources is nearly
perfect (cf. Table A1), our population variable is not sensitive to the selection of the base
series or the specific sequence of extensions.
Educational attainment♦: In order to construct a consolidated index representing the
average years of education attained in each country-year, we first gather data on the
average years of education as reported by Barro and Lee (1994, 2012); CLIO Infra (2015);
United Nations Development Program (2015) and secondary education enrollment rates
from Barro and Lee (1994); World Bank (2016). In a second step, since most of these data
are only reported in five-yearly intervals, we linearly interpolate missing observations in
each dataset. This seems reasonable, as far as educational attainment evolves gradually
over time. Subsequently, as it is the most extensive data series, the CLIO Infra (2015)
data on average years of education is selected as baseline series. Covering the period 1870-
2010, it provides 7964 (69.5%) country-year estimates for the average years of education.
In a next step, we maximally extend these estimates forward to 2016 and backwards to
1950 using the growth rates implied in the average years of education data reported by
United Nations Development Program (2015), adding another 1454 (10.85%) estimates.
Subsequently, we rely on the least squares third-order polynomial approximation strategy
outlined earlier to further extend this baseline series where possible. Afterward, we linearly
interpolate interrupted time series to add 103 (0.77%) more country-years. 2091 (15.6%)
country-years remain missing.
As detailed in Table A1, the correlation with the baseline values is fairly strong for
both the overlapping raw alternative estimates as well as the third-order polynomial pre-
dictions, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.90 to 0.97. In addition, the predictive
accuracy of our various third-order polynomial models generally is fairly high, where the
number of baseline estimates falling within the 99% confidence intervals of their predicted
counterparts range from 56.7% to 70%.
Life expectancy♦: Data on life expectancy is obtained from Barro and Lee (1994);
CLIO Infra (2015); World Bank (2016), where linear interpolation is first employed to add
a small number of missing observations. Since the correlation between the overlapping
observations in these datasets is near perfect, as detailed in Table A1, our consolidated
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variable of interest is constructed by averaging across all available data sources, leaving
1260 (9.4%) country-year observations missing.
Trade openness♦: Data on trade openness, defined as the value of imports and ex-
ports relative to GDP, are obtained from Heston et al. (1994); Correlates of War Project
(2015); Feenstra et al. (2015); World Bank (2016). After linearly interpolating missing
observations in each dataset, we select the Feenstra et al. (2015) data as our baseline. This
dataset covers the period 1950-2011 and provides us with 9041 (67.44%) country-year ob-
servations. Subsequently, we maximally extend the existing data forward and backwards
using the growth rates implied in the World Bank (2016) data for an additional 1145
(4%) country-year observations. Finally, relying on the least squares third-order poly-
nomial approximation procedure outlined above, we fill another 322 (2.4%) country-year
observations based on the Heston et al. (1994) data and another 489 (3.65%) country-
year observations based on the Correlates of War Project (2015) data.36 2425 (18.09%)
country-year observations remain missing.
Democracy♦: In order to construct a composite index of democracy, we incorporate
information on 8 measures of democracy: Melton, Meserve, and Pemstein (2010); Giu-
liano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo (2013); Center for Systemic Peace (2015); Gibler and
Miller (2014b); Vanhanen (2014); CLIO Infra (2015); Freedom House (2015).37 After
linearly interpolating missing observations in each data set, as it is the most extensive
data source, we consider Freedom House (2015) as our baseline series. Freedom House’s
(2015) continuous measure of democracy, which is based on a country’s degree of polit-
ical competition and political participation, provides us with 6553 (71.27%) democracy
estimates. Subsequently, sequentially relying on the alternative democracy measures, we
apply the third-order polynomial approximation approach described earlier to maximally
extend this baseline series forward and backwards. After this procedure, 2513 (18.75%)
country-year observations remain missing.
The fairly high correlation between both raw alternative as well as third-order poly-
nomial predicted democracy values and baseline values reported in Table A1, where cor-
relation coefficients range from 0.8 to 0.97, serves to motivate this approach. In addition,
the predictive accuracy which is in excess of 65% in all third-order polynomial models
except one provides further evidence that these alternative democracy indexes provide
useful information to assess missing values in the baseline series.
Fixed capital stock (% GDP): Data on national fixed capital stocks are derived from
Feenstra et al. (2015). This dataset covers the period 1950-2014 and provides us with
7494 (55.9%) country-year observations for national fixed capital stocks expressed in con-
stant 2005 US dollars. Subsequently, we maximally extend this baseline series forward
36Furthermore, we remove 17 negative data points resulting from the polynomial approximation procedure.
37For a comparison of various democracy indices, see among others Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and
Melton et al. (2010)
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and backward by applying the perpetual inventory method, relying on the depreciation
rates for national fixed capital stocks also reported by Feenstra et al. (2015) and the avail-
able information on gross fixed capital formation (see below), adding another 122 (0.1%)
country-year observations. After this procedure, 5789 (43.19%) country-year observations
remain missing.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% GDP): Data on gross fixed capital formation come
from World Bank (2016) and Feenstra et al. (2015). First, we rely on the perpetual
inventory method to derive gross fixed capital formation from the available information
on the values (in constant 2005 US dollars) of the fixed capital stock and the yearly
depreciation rate of fixed capital stocks reported by Feenstra et al. (2015). This procedure
provides us with 7352 (54.85%) country-year observations. Subsequently, we maximally
extend this baseline series forward and backwards by using the growth rates of gross
fixed capital formation as reported in constant 2010 dollars by the World Bank (2016),
adding another 1057 (7.88%) observations. World Bank (2016) data on gross fixed capital
formation are available between 1960 and 2016 and, reassuringly, correlate fairly strongly
with the gross fixed capital formation estimates we derived from the information reported
by Feenstra et al. (2015), at 0.89 for their 4871 common observations. After this procedure,
4996 (37.27%) country-year observations remain missing.
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Table A1: Constructed variables: data sources and components
Variable Data source Description % Obs. [% Int.] r / rˆ Accuracy
GDP per capita∗∗∗ (baseline)
The Madison Project (2017) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 63.24 [0] 1 / . .
World Bank (2016) GDP per capita (constant 2005 $) 19.78 [0.5] 0.83 / . .
World Resources Institute (2015) Total CO2 emissions (Metric Tons) 6.48 [0] 0.84 / 0.89 55.19
World Bank (2016) Per capita CO2 emissions (Metric Tons) 2.69 [0] 0.83 / 0.89 54.03
Correlates of War Project (2012) Primary Energy Consumption (Metric Ton Coal Equivalent) 2.69 [0] 0.66 / 0.85 57.57
n.a. missing 5.12 [0] . / . .
GDP per capita∗∗ (alternative)
The Madison Project (2017) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 63.24 [0] 1 / . .
The Conference Board (2015) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 11.23 [0.73] 1 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) GDP per capita (1985 int. prices) 1.28 [0.95] 0.98 / . .
Heston et al. (1994) Real GDP per capita 0.4 [0] 0.97 / . .
World Bank (2016) GDP per capita (constant 2005 $) 12.51 [0] 0.83 / . .
Feenstra et al. (2015) GDP per capita (chained PPPs, 2005$) 0.3 [0] 0.90 / . .
n.a. missing 11.03 [.] . /. .
Population∗∗
CLIO Infra (2015) Total population 75.08 [55.39] 1 / . .
Heston et al. (1994) Total population 4.93 [0] 1 / . .
Feenstra et al. (2015) Total population 5.69 [0] 1 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) Total population 0.07 [0.01] 1 / . .
World Bank (2016) Total population 10.26 [0] 1 / . .
The Madison Project (2017) Total population 0.56 [0] 1 / . .
Correlates of War Project (2012) Total population 0.16 [0] 1 / . .
n.a. missing 1.76 [.] . / . .
Education∗∗∗
CLIO Infra (2015) Average years of education 59.41 [52.69] 1 / . .
United Nations Development Program (2015) Average years of education 10.85 [0.4] 0.94 / . .
Barro and Lee (2012) Average years of education 6.35 [0.51] 0.95 / 0.97 65.41
Barro and Lee (1994) Average years of education 1.06 [0.87] 0.93 / 0.95 70.09
World Bank (2016) Secondary enrollment rate 5.71 [2.43] 0.90 / 0.94 56.72
Barro and Lee (1994) Secondary enrollment rate 0.25 [0.18] 0.90 / 0.94 61.40
Linearly interpolated . 0.77 [0.77] . / . .
n.a. missing 15.6 [.] . / . .
Health∗
CLIO Infra (2015) Life expectancy 77.99 [0] 1 / . .
World Bank (2016) Life expectancy 76.71 [0.6] 0.99 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) Life expectancy 22.16 [17.05] 0.97 / . .
n.a. missing 7.35 [.] . / . .
Trade Openness∗∗∗
Feenstra et al. (2015) (imports + exports)/GDP 67.44 [0.00] 1 / . .
World Bank (2016) (imports + exports)/GDP 8.54 [0.00] 0.80 / . .
Heston et al. (1994) (imports + exports)/GDP 2.4 [0.00] 0.70 / 0.84 70.42
Correlates of War Project (2015) (imports + exports)/GDP 3.65 [0.00] 0.40 / 0.77 59.25
n.a. missing 18.09 [.] . / . .
Democracy∗∗∗
CLIO Infra (2015) Vanhanen Index of Democracy 49.10 [1.34] 1 / . .
Vanhanen (2014) Vanhanen Index of Democracy 22.17 [0.14] 0.97 / . .
Gibler and Miller (2014b) Combined Polity2 Index 1.89 [0] 0.90 / 0.94 68.03
Melton et al. (2010) Unified Democracy Scores 0.76 [0.15] 0.89 / 0.93 65.81
Giuliano et al. (2013) Freedom House Index 3.74 [0.46] 0.81 / 0.89 27.63
Freedom House (2015) Freedom House Index 0.14 [0.1] 0.80 / 0.92 66.43
Center for Systemic Peace (2015) Revised Combined Polity Score 0.47 [0] 0.82 / 0.91 66.36
Linearly interpolated . 3.45 [3.45] . / . .
n.a. missing 18.75 [.] . / . .
Note: Baseline sources in bold. * indicates that the consolidated variable is obtained by averaging across all available data sources, ** indicates that the consolidated variable is ob-
tained by applying the regular data construction procedure outlined in appendix A, *** indicates that the consolidated variable is obtained by applying the third-order polynomial approximation
procedure outlined in appendix A. The percentage of linearly interpolated country-years contributions by each data source in square brackets. r reports the correlation between baseline and
alternative values, rˆ reports the correlation between baseline and third-order polynomial predicted values. Where relevant, the last column reports the percentage of baseline observations falling
withing the 99% confidence intervals of their third-order polynomial predicted counterparts.
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B Estimation strategy
Section 3 proposes a semi-parametric estimation procedure to quantify the net per capita
GDP gain of independence that is rooted in the synthetic control framework pioneered by
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). This section provides a more formal description of this
estimation procedure and sheds more light on its underlying identifying assumptions.
To do so, suppose that in a sample containing J+1 countries, indexed by i = {1, . . . , J+
1}, observed over T time periods, indexed by t = {1950, . . . , T0, . . . , T}, country j decides
to declare independence at time t = T0 and that we are interested in determining the
causal effect of this decision, if any, on its per capita GDP trajectory. To do so, denote
by yNjt the level of log per capita GDP that would be observed in country j if it did not
(yet) declare independence, and let yTjt denote the outcome that would be observed if
country j declared itself independent prior to time t + 1. Abstracting from anticipation
effects, the causal economic effect of declaring independence at time t ≥ T0 is defined as
βjt = y
T
jt − yNjt .38 The observed outcome for each country i can be written as
yi,t = y
N
i,t + βi,tNICi,t (1A)
where NICi,t is an independence dummy equal to 1 for each NIC in each year after it
gained independence and 0 otherwise while βi,t captures the economic impact of secession
of country i at time t.
It follows that estimating the causal impact of country j’s declaration of indepen-
dence at time t, βˆjt, boils down to estimating the counterfactual, post-independence per
capita GDP trajectory that would be observed in that country if it had never declared
independence, yˆNj,t:
βˆj,t = yj,t − yˆNj,t , t ≥ T0 (2A)
Although yNj,t remains unobserved for t ≥ T0, suppose we do know yNi,t to linearly depend
on a number of observed growth determinants in each country i. More specifically, suppose
we summarize the country-specific information on x observed growth determinants in a
(n × 1) vector of unaffected observed covariates denoted by Xi = [xi,1, . . . , xi,n], where
n ≤ Tx. Note that Xi may contain past or future values of the observed characteristics
as long as these are unaffected by country j’s decision to secede. In addition, assume
that we do not observe all the relevant characteristics determining yNj,t and denote by Zi
the (m × 1) vector collecting all of these, potentially time-varying, unobserved growth
determinants, where m ≤ (T0 − 1950). Note that Zi may also subsume a country fixed
effect. Finally, assume yNi,t is subject to year fixed effects, ηt, and a mean-zero transitory
38If anticipation effects are at play, T0 should be redefined to coincide with the first period these play a
role. We will come back to this.
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shock, i,t. Summarizing, we assume y
N
j,t to be given by
yNj,t = θtXj + λtZj + ηt + j,t (3A)
where θt and λt denote the (1 × n) and (1 × m) vectors of unknown, potentially time-
varying, population parameters associated with Xj and Zj respectively.
To simulate the counterfactual post-independence yNj,t-trajectory that would be ob-
served in NIC j in absence of state fragmentation, consider a linear combination of the
remaining J control countries defined by the weighting vector W∗ = [w∗1, . . . , w∗j−1, w
∗
j+1,
. . . , w∗J+1], in such a way that the following four conditions hold: (i) the resulting weighted
vector of unaffected observed characteristics,
∑J+1
i 6=j wiXi, exactly mirrors that of country
j, Xj , (ii) the pre-independence outcome path is identical in the seceding country an its
synthetic counterpart, (iii) control countries receiving positive weight were independent
themselves at the time of country j’s declaration of independence but (iv) none of them
declared independence themselves in the 10 years preceding country j’s declaration of
independence. Note that this last condition is imposed to ensure that the control group
itself is not contaminated by economic effects of secession and/or its anticipation stemming
from one of its component parts. Formally, assume there exists a W∗ such that:
Condition 1A
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iXi = Xj ,
E [Xi|NICj,t] = E [Xi] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , J + 1} & ∀t ∈ T
Condition 2A
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,1950 = y
N
j,1950 , . . . ,
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,T0−1 = y
N
j,T0−1
Condition 3A
∃t ∈ {T0 − 10, . . . , T} : NICi,t −NICi,t−1 = 1 ⇔ w∗i = 0
Observe that, by use of equation (3A), the value of the outcome variable of this syn-
thetic control country can be written as
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,t = θt
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iXi + λt
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi + ηt +
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i i,t (4A)
such that the discrepancy between the outcome path that would be observed in (future)
NIC j in absence of state fragmentation (equation (3A)) and that of its synthetic coun-
54
terpart (equation (4A)) satisfying conditions (1A) through (3A) is given by:
yNj,t −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,t = λt
(
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi
)
+
(
j,t −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i i,t
)
(5A)
Note that this also holds in the pre-independence period and denote by YPi , λ
P and Pi
the
(
(T0 − 1950) × 1
)
vector, the
(
(T0 − 1950) ×m
)
matrix and the
(
(T0 − 1950) × 1
)
vector with the tth row equal to yNi,t, λt and i,t respectively. This implies that the pre-
independence discrepancy between NIC j’s (fully observed) yNj,t-trajectory and that of its
synthetic version can be written as:
Y Pj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i Y
P
i = λ
P
(
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi
)
+
(
Pj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i
)
(6A)
or, equivalently:
λP
(
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi
)
=
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i − Pj (7A)
Pre-multiplying both sides of equation (7A) by the inverse of λP , (λP
′
λP )−1λP ′ ,
yields39
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi = (λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′(J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i − Pj
)
(8A)
Finally, inserting this expression for Zj−
∑J+1
i 6=j w
∗
iZi in equation (5A) yields an expres-
sion for the discrepancy between the (partly unobserved) full outcome path that would be
observed in the seceding country, j, in absence of state fragmentation and the same (fully
observed) outcome path for its synthetic version, W∗:
yNj,t −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,t = λt(λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i − λt(λP
′
λP )−1λP
′
Pj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i (j,t − i,t) (9A)
Abadie et al. (2010) prove that under standard conditions, if the number of preinter-
vention periods (T0-1950) is large relative to the scale of the transitory shocks (i,t), the
right-hand side of equation (9A) will tend towards zero. This suggests using
βˆj,T0+s = yj,T0+s −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i yi,T0+s (10A)
as an estimator for the independence dividend of country j, s years after independence.
In practice, since there often does not exist a set of weights that exactly satisfies con-
ditions (1A) through (3A), standard practice is to construct the synthetic control such
39Note that assuming m ≤ T0 − 1950 ensures that λP is nonsingular and thus has a well-defined inverse.
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that these conditions hold approximately. In the empirical exercise of subsection (3.3),
we do so by relying on the nested optimalization algorithm developed by Abadie et al.
(2014, Appendix B), which defines the optimal weight vector W∗ such that each syn-
thetic control country minimizes the Root Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE) of
pre-independence outcomes (see equation (6A)).40 We restrict the pretreatment period to
maximally 10 years prior to the declaration of independence for each NIC in the sample,
discarding those NICs lacking sufficient pretreatment information.41 Our choice of pre-
treatment characteristics stems from the growth literature and includes population size,
population density, educational attainment, life expectancy, trade openness and per capita
battle deaths.
40The synthetic control algorithm is implemented by Abadie et al.’s (2010) synth-command in Stata 13.1.
41Table A2 lists the NICs included in the synthetic control algorithm.
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C A control function approach to account for endogeneity
One relevant concern with the second-step results presented in subsection 4.2 is that they
ignore the potential endogeneity of the first-stage independence dividend estimates and
their potential determinants. This appendix details the control function we employ to
circumvent the endogeneity issue by parametrically controlling for it. Subsection C.1
formalizes this endogeneity issue and the control function approach we propose to deal
with it. Subsection C.2 reports the results of a monotonicity check that aims to determine
whether a critical identifying assumption of this estimation approach is met in our data.
C.1 The control function approach
To see how endogeneity might emerge in our baseline model, assume that the residual in
equation (6) can be divided into an exogenous and an endogenous component, such that
relative importance of each potential channel can be estimated by
βˆi,r,t,s = α1 + α2β¯i + α3β¯
placebo
i,r,t,s + λXi,r,t,s + ηs + δr + µt + φm + ωi,r,t,s + ψi,r,t,s︸ ︷︷ ︸
i,r,t,s
(11A)
ωi,r,t,s and ψi,r,t,s thus measure deviations of independence dividends from their ex-
pected values. Paraphrasing Ornaghi and Van Beveren (2011, p. 6), the difference
between both unobservables is that ωi,r,t,s refers to unobserved factors that are observed
by inhabitants of NICs and are likely to affect their economic decisions (eg. political
(in)stability) while i,r,t,s collects all random, transitory shocks to the independence divi-
dend unobserved by the NIC (as well as the econometrician) and thus affecting economic
performance but not economic decisions (eg. unexpected natural disasters). We refer to
ωi,r,t,s as the ‘efficiency gain of independence’ noting that it can be either positive (eg. in-
dependence reduces political instability and, thus, improves growth prospects) or negative
(eg. independence increases political instability and, thus, worsens growth prospects).42
The most important takeaway from equation (11A) is that the identification of the
unknown parameters requires the potential determinants of the independence dividends
to be exogenous or, analogously, to be unaffected by the (perceived) efficiency gain of
independence, ωi,r,t,s. Indeed, in this case E (xi,r,t,sωi,r,t,s) = 0 ∀x ∈ X by assumption and
the regression coefficients λˆ are unbiased estimates for the true parameters.
Nevertheless, it may seem unlikely that the potential determinants of the independence
dividend are exogenous and that economic agents in NICs disregard any information on the
efficiency gain of independence when taking economically relevant decisions. If economic
agents have a good knowledge of the efficiency gain of independence, ωi,r,t,s, and especially
42Thus, the efficiency gain of independence is defined as the residual from the relation between the true
independence dividend, its the underlying growth determinants and all random, transitory shocks.
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if these efficiency gains are persistent, endogeneity arises because economic decisions will
partially reflect beliefs about ωi,r,t,s.
43 More specifically, assume that the efficiency gain
of independence follows a first order Markov process such that
ωi,r,t,s = E (ωi,r,t,s | ωi,t−1,s−1) + ξi,r,t,s = g (ωi,t−1,s−1) + ξi,r,t,s (12A)
with g(·) an unknown function and ξi,r,t,s a surprise news component unforeseen at time
t− 1. This allows us to rewrite equation (11A) as
βˆi,r,t,s = α1 + α2β¯i + α3β¯
placebo
i,r,t,s + λXi,r,t,s + ηs + δr + µt + φm + g (ωi,t−1,s−1) + ξi,r,t,s + ψi,r,t,s (13A)
Formally, endogeneity arises whenever economic agents in a specific NIC know the
(expected) efficiency gain of independence at the time economically relevant decisions are
made such that the efficiency gain simultaneously affects economic performance, βˆi,r,t,s,
and the decisions contained in Xi,r,t,s. For instance, NICs may reap the benefits of in-
creasing efficiency gains of independence by opening up to trade, introducing an upward
bias in the value of the coefficient estimate for the relative importance of trade openness.44
A similar simultaneity issue has long been the central focus of the vast methodological
literature surrounding total factor productivity estimation, which at least dates back to
the seminal work by Marschak and Andrews (1944).45 Olley and Pakes (1996) were the
first to solve this issue by explicitly controlling for the unobserved confounder using proxy
variables. Modifying their approach to fit our purposes, our identification strategy relies
on the assumption that the fixed capital stock of a NIC, Ki,r,t,s, is fully determined by
choices made in period t− 1 through the following law of motion:46
Ki,r,t,s = (1− δt)Ki,t−1,s−1 + Ii,t−1,s−1 (14A)
where δt captures the yearly depreciation rate of the fixed capital stock and Ii,r,t,s measures
gross fixed capital formation. Note that this law of motion assumes that it takes a full year
for fixed capital investments to translate into fixed capital. Crucially, this implies that both
fixed capital (Ki,r,t,s) as well as fixed capital investments (Ii,r,t,s) depend on the expected
efficiency gain of independence in year t, g(ωi,t−1,s−1), as higher expected efficiency gains
should make it more profitable to increase the fixed capital stock. In addition, assuming
43If efficiency gains of independence are not persistent, g (ωi,t−1,s−1) would drop in equation (13A) such
that endogeneity would only arise if the potential determinants of the independence dividend would
depend on the ‘surprise’ news component.
44On the one hand, income growth may translate into import growth; on the other hand, wide evidence
shows that productive firms self-select into export markets due to the large fixed costs associated with
foreign market entry (Jovanovic, 1982; Melitz, 2003; Das, Roberts, & Tybout, 2007).
45For a recent overview of this literature, see for instance Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015).
46The empirical application relies on national fixed capital and gross fixed capital formation shares of
GDP. Data on gross fixed capital, gross fixed capital formation and the yearly depreciation rate of fixed
capital are derived from Feenstra et al. (2015) and World Bank (2016). For more information on data
construction and sources, see appendix A.
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that capital investments are chosen after the realization of the news component, investment
will also depend on the efficiency shock and we have that Ii,r,t,s = f (Ki,r,t,s, ωi,r,t,s).
Under the additional assumption that investment in fixed capital is strictly increasing
in the unobserved efficiency gain of independence, this suggests proxying the efficiency
gain of independence by inverting the investment demand function.47 The unobserved
efficiency gain of independence is then defined as
ωi,r,t,s = f
−1 (Ki,r,t,s, Ii,r,t,s) (15A)
Intuitively, the fixed capital investment decisions of NICs in addition to their existing
fixed capital stock are thus taken to contain useful information on the (perceived) efficiency
gain of their independence declaration at a certain point in time. In this sense, the control
function can be considered to proxy for (unobserved) ‘business sentiment’ or ‘confidence in
the economic future’ in the immediate post-independence period. This, in turn, suggests
adding the control function, f−1 (Ki,r,t,s, Ii,r,t,s), to regression equation (11A) to control
for simultaneity bias. More specifically, equation (15A) allows us to express both the
expected efficiency gain (g (ωi,t−1,s−1)) as well as the the innovation in the efficiency gain
of independence (ξi,r,t,s) as a function of observables and hence to control for ωi,r,t,s by
simply adding this control function to equation (13A) as follows:
βˆi,r,t,s = α1 + α2β¯i + α3β¯
placebo
i,r,t,s + λXi,r,t,s + ηs + δr + µt + φm + f
−1 (Ki,r,t,s, Ii,r,t,s) + ψi,r,t,s (16A)
Estimation of (16A)is further complicated by the fact that f−1 (Ki,r,t,s, Ii,r,t,s) has an
unknown functional form. To proceed, in line with Olley and Pakes (1996), we assume that
it can be approximated by polynomial expansion of orderO such that f−1 (Ki,r,t,s, Ii,r,t,s) ≈∑O
o=0
∑O−o
m=0 αo,mK
o
i,r,t,sI
m
i,r,t,s.
48 More specifically, this implies that the single-stage least
squares model summarized in equation (16A) can be implemented by estimating
βˆi,r,t,s = α1 +α2β¯i+α3β¯
placebo
i,r,t,s +λXi,r,t,s+ηs+δr+µt+φm+
O∑
o=0
O−o∑
m=0
αo,mK
o
i,r,t,sI
m
i,r,t,s+ψi,r,t,s (17A)
Equation (17A) summarizes the estimation procedure we use in robustness section 4.3
to eliminate endogeneity bias by explicitly controlling for it, under the assumption that
efficiency shocks occur before fixed capital investments are made.
47If this monotonicity assumption would be violated, it would be impossible to map every potential value
of Ii,r,t,s to a unique value for the unobserved efficiency gain of independence, ωi,r,t,s, which would
essentially invalidate this estimation procedure. Given its central role in the estimation procedure,
Ornaghi and Van Beveren (2011) propose a monotonicity test to verify to what extent the monotonicity
assumption holds in the actual data. The results for our data are discussed in appendix C.2. For similar
reasons, inversion of f also requires that the efficiency gain of independence is the only unobservable
entering the inversion function.
48Note that the inclusion of the polynomial expansion implies that we can no longer identify the capital
coefficient, as it is collinear with the polynomial in Ki,r,t,s and Ii,r,t,s. In contrast to the total factor
productivity literature, we are not interested in the capital coefficient however, such that this property
does not complicate our estimation procedure.
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C.2 Monotonicity check
The estimator discussed in the previous subsection relies on the crucial assumption that
gross fixed capital formation is strictly increasing in the (unobserved) efficiency gain of
independence, as a necessary condition for the control function to accurately proxy for the
latter. This subsection implements a specification test to verify whether this identification
assumption is likely to be met in our data.
Ornaghi and Van Beveren (2011) propose a simple monotonicity test to check whether
this identification assumption is likely to hold in particular datasets. Building on this
procedure, note that the monotonicity assumption in our setting boils down to assuming
that for any given value of the fixed capital stock, NICs make larger gross investments in
the fixed capital stock the higher the (unobserved) efficiency gain of independence.
One crude way of assessing this is to approximate the unobserved efficiency gain as
the residual of the regression formalized in equation (11A), abstracting from the random
shock ψi,r,t,s and hence implicitly assume that ωi,r,t,s ≈ ωi,r,t,s +ψi,r,t,s. Subsequently, this
residual can regressed on a polynomial in fixed capital and gross fixed capital investment
from the appropriate order to compute the expected efficiency gain of independence for any
value of both predictors. Formally, denoting the residual in equation (11A) by $i,r,t,s =
ωi,r,t,s +ψi,r,t,s, the monotonicity test boils down to comparing various predictions for the
estimated efficiency gain of independence, $ˆi,r,t,s , from the following model
$ˆi,r,t,s = α0 +
O∑
o=0
O−o∑
m=0
αo,mK
o
i,r,t,sI
m
i,r,t,s + ζi,r,t,s (18A)
More specifically, we rely on the estimation results for this model to compute the
predicted the efficiency gain of independence for all gross fixed capital investment values
contained within the support of Ii,r,t,s while sequentially fixing the value of Ki,r,t,s at its
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile. The idea is thus to fix the value of fixed capital
at one of these five percentile values and to subsequently check whether the predicted
efficiency gain of independence effectively monotonically increases over the support of
gross fixed capital formation in our sample. If this would be the case, such that Ii,r,t,s >
Ij,t,s ⇒ $ˆi,r,t,s > $ˆj,t,s, this would constitute empirical evidence that the monotonicity
assumption is not violated in the data. Needless to say, this validity check can detect cases
where the monotonicity assumption is violated in the data, yet can only provide necessary
but not sufficient evidence that the monotonicity assumption actually holds.
Figure A1 reports the result of the monotonicity tests pertaining to the various the
estimation models discussed in subsection 4.2. Reassuringly, the figures suggest that the
monotonicity assumption seems not to be violated in any part of the support of Ii,r,t,s
for any the selected percentile values of Ki,r,t,s. Thus, at first glance, all observations in
our sample appear to satisfy the monotonicity assumption - well above the 80%-threshold
for valid inference proposed by Ornaghi and Van Beveren (2011). We conclude that
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Figure A1: Monotonicity test
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Note: This figure plots the efficiency gain of independence as predicted by the estimation model of equation (18A),
$ˆi,r,t,s, when fixing Ki,ts at its 10
th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile values, respectively indicated by Kp10,
Kp25, Kp50, Kp75, Kp90 in the figures, and gradually increasing the value of Ii,r,t,s over its support, where Ip10
and Ip90 respectively show the 10th and 90th percentile values for Ii,r,t,s in our sample. The raw efficiency gain
of independence, or $ˆi,r,t,s in equation (18A), is estimated as the residual of the model summarized in equation
(11A). The results are reported for the different estimation models reported in table 4, as identified in the subtitles.
the monotonicity tests fail to find evidence of the critical identification assumption of
monotonicity being violated in our data, thus allowing for valid estimation.
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Table A2: Newly Independent Countries: 1950-2016
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Libya 1951 Uganda 1962 Tuvalu 1978
Cambodia∗ 1953 Kenya 1963 Kiribati 1979
Laos 1953 Zanzibar 1963 St. Lucia 1979
German Democratic Republic 1954 Malawi 1964 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1979
Republic of Vietnam 1954 Malta∗ 1964 Vanuatu 1980
Vietnam 1954 Zambia 1964 Antigua & Barbuda 1981
German Federal Republic 1955 Gambia 1965 Belize 1981
Morocco 1956 Maldives 1965 St. Kitts and Nevis 1983
Sudan 1956 Singapore∗ 1965 Brunei 1984
Tunisia 1956 Zimbabwe 1965 Federated States of Micronesia 1986
Ghana 1957 Barbados 1966 Marshall Islands 1986
Malaysia 1957 Basutoland (Lesotho) 1966 Namibia 1990
Guinea∗ 1958 Botswana 1966 Armenia∗ 1991
Benin 1960 Guyana 1966 Azerbaijan 1991
Burkina Faso 1960 Yemen People’s Republic 1967 Belarus 1991
Cameroon 1960 Equatorial Guinea 1968 Estonia∗ 1991
Central African Republic 1960 Mauritius 1968 Georgia∗ 1991
Chad 1960 Nauru 1968 Kazakhstan 1991
Congo 1960 Swaziland 1968 Kyrgyzstan 1991
Cyprus 1960 Fiji 1970 Latvia∗ 1991
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960 Tonga 1970 Lithuania∗ 1991
Gabon 1960 Bahrain 1971 Moldova 1991
Ivory Coast 1960 Bhutan 1971 Russia 1991
Madagascar 1960 Oman 1971 Tajikistan 1991
Mali 1960 Qatar 1971 Turkmenistan∗ 1991
Mauritania 1960 United Arab Emirates 1971 Ukraine∗ 1991
Niger 1960 Bangladesh 1972 Uzbekistan∗ 1991
Nigeria 1960 Bahamas 1973 Bosnia and Herzegovina∗ 1992
Senegal 1960 Grenada 1974 Croatia∗ 1992
Somalia 1960 Guinea-Bissau 1974 Slovenia 1992
Togo 1960 Angola 1975 Czech Republic 1993
Kuwait 1961 Cape Verde 1975 Eritrea 1993
Sierra Leone 1961 Comoros 1975 Macedonia∗ 1993
Syria 1961 Mozambique 1975 Slovakia 1993
Tanzania 1961 Papua New Guinea 1975 Palau∗ 1994
Algeria∗ 1962 Sao Tome and Principe 1975 East Timor∗ 2002
Burundi 1962 Suriname 1975 Montenegro∗ 2006
Jamaica∗ 1962 Seychelles 1976 Serbia 2006
Ruanda 1962 Djibouti 1977 Kosovo 2008
Samoa∗ 1962 Dominica 1978 South Sudan∗ 2011
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 Solomon Islands 1978
Note: * indicates countries that gained independence following a successful independence referendum. Data on historical independence
referendums and their outcomes are taken from Qvortrup (2014).
 indicates countries included in the synthetic control algorithm (see section 3).
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Table A3: Semi-parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession
t = 0 + 1 t = 0 + 5 t = 0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
Algeria -0.40 -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.08 -0.77 -0.77*** -0.72*** -0.15 -0.37 -0.37*** -0.24*** 0.20*
Angola -0.40 -0.41*** -0.39*** -0.53*** -0.42 -0.43*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.46 -0.47*** -0.30*** -0.46***
Antigua & Barbuda 0.31 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.22*** 0.82 0.84*** 0.87*** 0.61*** 0.95 0.97*** 1.13*** 0.72***
Armenia -0.89 -0.80*** -0.75*** -0.55*** -0.90 -0.81*** -0.73*** -0.36*** -0.37 -0.28*** -0.09 0.09***
Azerbaijan -0.45 -0.47*** -0.42*** -0.24*** -1.27 -1.28*** -1.20*** -0.84*** 0.10 0.08** 0.28*** 0.24***
Bahamas -0.64 -0.63*** -0.62*** -0.10 -0.84 -0.83*** -0.79*** -0.10 -0.00 0.01 0.18*** 0.39***
Bahrain 0.24 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.07* 0.43 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.07 0.67 0.64*** 0.85*** 0.01
Bangladesh -0.24 -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.35*** -0.36 -0.36*** -0.29*** -0.44*** -0.39 -0.39*** -0.18*** -0.54***
Barbados 0.08 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.06* -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.63 -0.58*** -0.48*** -0.02
Basutoland (Lesotho) 0.07 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.17*** -0.21 -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.22 -0.21*** -0.11** -0.15**
Belarus -0.25 -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.01 -0.60 -0.59*** -0.51*** -0.17** 0.20 0.21*** 0.40*** 0.13*
Belize 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.17*** -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.21*** 0.30 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.02
Benin 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.21*** 0.12 0.12*** 0.14*** -0.50*** -0.10 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.56***
Bhutan -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.17*** -0.12 -0.11 -0.06* -0.11** -0.06 -0.06 0.15** -0.00
Botswana 0.16 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.03 0.47 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.19*** 1.09 1.10*** 1.20*** 0.65***
Brunei 0.46 0.25* 0.26** 0.48*** -0.28 -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.01 -0.34 -0.54*** -0.36*** 0.09
Burundi -0.03 -0.03* -0.02 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.57 -0.57*** -0.44*** -0.17***
Cape Verde -0.25 -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.08* 0.04 0.09** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.19 0.23*** 0.40*** 0.43***
Comoros -0.33 -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.68*** -0.46 -0.46*** -0.39*** -0.90*** -0.15 -0.14*** 0.03 -0.80***
Croatia -0.43 -0.72*** -0.65*** -0.58*** -0.32 -0.61*** -0.51*** -0.48*** -0.55 -0.83*** -0.60*** -0.51***
Cyprus 0.34 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.25 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 1.42 1.43*** 1.53*** 0.77***
Czech Republic -0.39 -0.35*** -0.28*** -0.15*** -0.42 -0.39*** -0.31*** -0.17*** -0.53 -0.50*** -0.28*** -0.17***
Democratic Republic of the Congo -0.22 -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.11*** -0.18 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.06** -0.72 -0.72*** -0.62*** -0.34***
Djibouti -0.27 -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.12*** -0.29 -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.11** -1.14 -1.14*** -1.01*** -0.31***
East Timor -0.64 -0.18 -0.13** 0.25** -1.01 -0.54 -0.44*** -0.01
continued on next page
63
continued
t = 0 + 1 t = 0 + 5 t = 0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
Estonia -0.41 -0.43*** -0.37*** -0.23*** -0.42 -0.44*** -0.35*** -0.20*** -0.01 -0.02 0.18*** 0.13**
Fiji 0.22 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.04 0.85 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.48*** 0.63 0.71*** 0.88*** 0.96***
Gambia 0.11 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.09** -0.06 -0.05*** -0.00 -0.09** -0.40 -0.40*** -0.31*** -0.24***
Georgia -0.83 -0.83*** -0.78*** -0.83*** -1.17 -1.17*** -1.08*** -1.11*** -0.55 -0.55*** -0.34*** -0.64***
Ghana -0.11 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.03** 0.07 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.41 -0.41*** -0.34*** -0.39***
Grenada -0.19 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.30*** -0.35 -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.42*** -0.01 0.03 0.20*** -0.09
Guinea-Bissau 0.13 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08** -0.05 0.24 0.23*** 0.43*** -0.09
Guyana -0.19 -0.12** -0.10 -0.06* -0.22 -0.15** -0.11* -0.08* -1.02 -0.94*** -0.89*** -0.52**
Jamaica 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.07* -0.90 -0.93*** -0.83*** -0.59***
Kazakhstan -0.43 -0.43*** -0.38*** -0.13*** -0.79 -0.79*** -0.70*** -0.24*** -0.06 -0.06* 0.13** 0.10***
Kenya -0.12 -0.10*** -0.08* -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.09*** -0.43 -0.41*** -0.32*** 0.04
Kiribati -0.54 -0.29* -0.25** -0.04 -0.74 -0.50*** -0.47*** -0.24*** -1.04 -0.80*** -0.63*** -0.30***
Kyrgyzstan -0.34 -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.01 -0.91 -0.88*** -0.80*** -0.10 -0.80 -0.78*** -0.58*** -0.11
Latvia -0.75 -0.77*** -0.71*** -0.42*** -0.89 -0.91*** -0.82*** -0.50*** -0.52 -0.54*** -0.34*** -0.18***
Lithuania -0.49 -0.47*** -0.42*** -0.31*** -0.78 -0.76*** -0.68*** -0.49*** -0.29 -0.27*** -0.07 -0.20***
Malawi -0.02 -0.02** -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03*** -0.01 0.06*** -0.26 -0.26*** -0.18*** 0.01
Malaysia -0.17 -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.06 -0.06** -0.06** -0.03 -0.19 -0.19*** -0.09 -0.03
Malta 0.05 0.05** 0.06 0.07** -0.07 -0.08*** -0.05 -0.02 0.78 0.78*** 0.87*** 0.58***
Mauritius -0.22 -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.20 -0.20*** -0.17*** -0.24*** 0.12 0.11*** 0.22*** 0.20
Moldova -0.36 -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.46*** -1.08 -0.98*** -0.89*** -1.00*** -0.77 -0.66*** -0.47*** -0.54***
Montenegro -0.13 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.10** -0.05 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.12*
Morocco -0.12 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.35 -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.80 -0.80*** -0.69*** -0.63***
Mozambique -0.30 -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.14*** -0.12 -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.09 -0.09 -0.15*** 0.02 -0.06
Namibia -0.20 -0.12*** -0.07** -0.07 -0.21 -0.13*** -0.03 0.02 -0.16 -0.08*** 0.14** 0.34***
Nigeria -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12*** 0.11 0.11*** 0.12*** -0.05** 0.28 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.07
Palau -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.18 -0.15*** -0.06 -0.35*** 0.29 0.31*** 0.52*** -0.08
continued on next page
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continued
t = 0 + 1 t = 0 + 5 t = 0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
Papua New Guinea -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 0.12** 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.31*** -0.31 -0.36*** -0.19** 0.13
Qatar 0.26 0.03 0.05 0.07*** 0.65 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.31*** -0.17 -0.40*** -0.20** -0.56*
Ruanda -0.05 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06** -0.18 -0.18*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 0.22 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.13**
Russia -0.21 -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.60 -0.61*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.07 -0.08*** 0.14** 0.01
Sao Tome and Principe -0.01 0.02 0.05* -0.20 -0.15 -0.11*** -0.03 -0.29 -1.30 -1.27*** -1.05*** -0.77***
Serbia -0.07 0.06*** 0.13*** -0.05 0.08*** 0.15***
Seychelles 0.09 0.11*** 0.15*** -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.07** -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.14** -0.04
Sierra Leone -0.04 -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03 -0.37 -0.38*** -0.34*** -0.15 -0.22 -0.22*** -0.09* 0.06
Singapore 0.01 0.04* 0.06 0.08** 0.36 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.25*** 0.95 0.98*** 1.07*** 0.47***
Slovakia -0.50 -0.40*** -0.33*** -0.06*** -0.42 -0.31*** -0.24*** 0.01 -0.38 -0.27*** -0.06 0.03
Slovenia -0.56 -0.53*** -0.47*** -0.20** -0.53 -0.50*** -0.40*** -0.23*** -0.83 -0.79*** -0.56*** -0.27***
Solomon Islands 0.20 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.05 0.05 0.08* 0.18*** 0.17 0.17*** 0.33*** 0.22**
St. Lucia -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.15* 0.15 0.18** 0.20*** -0.04 0.43 0.46*** 0.60*** 0.19**
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.22 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.67 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.58*** 1.01 1.02*** 1.16*** 0.63***
Suriname 0.22 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.27** -0.17 -0.19*** -0.12** 0.20* -1.39 -1.42*** -1.25*** -0.56***
Swaziland 0.26 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.10* -0.14 -0.18*** -0.14*** 0.23** -1.43 -1.47*** -1.36*** 0.08
Tajikistan -0.65 -0.62*** -0.55*** -0.40** -1.55 -1.51*** -1.42*** -1.09*** -1.28 -1.24*** -1.04*** -0.79***
Trinidad and Tobago 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06*** 0.03 0.03 0.09* 0.06* 0.12 0.12*** 0.23*** 0.22***
Turkmenistan -0.27 -0.27*** -0.22*** 0.25*** -0.76 -0.75*** -0.67*** 0.35*** -0.32 -0.31*** -0.12** 0.52***
Uganda -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02** 0.04 0.07 -0.81 -0.80*** -0.69*** -0.52***
Ukraine -0.23 -0.22*** -0.16*** 0.16*** -1.08 -1.07*** -0.97*** -0.24*** -0.82 -0.81*** -0.59*** 0.01
United Arab Emirates -0.01 -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.22*** 0.49 0.26*** 0.32*** -0.08 0.57 0.34*** 0.56*** 0.52**
Uzbekistan -0.35 -0.33*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.60 -0.58*** -0.49*** -0.27** -0.16 -0.14*** 0.06 -0.27***
Vanuatu -0.29 -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.38*** -0.26 -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.18* -0.80 -0.81*** -0.61*** -0.28**
Zambia 0.12 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15** -0.06 -0.05** -0.02 -0.06 -0.68 -0.66*** -0.57*** -0.49***
Zimbabwe -0.10 -0.12*** -0.09** -0.15*** 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.12*** -0.35 -0.37*** -0.31*** -0.39***
continued on next page
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continued
t = 0 + 1 t = 0 + 5 t = 0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt
pure
Note: This table reports country-specific, semi-parametric estimates of the independence dividend. Results are reported for all available NICs and pertain to the 1st, 5th and
20th year after independence respectively. Columns headed by βˆjt report the estimated percentage difference between per capita GDP for the NIC listed in the first column
and its synthetic control version, corresponding to equation 10A; columns headed by βˆtDDjt report the trend-demeaned independence dividend estimate, net of its 10-yearly
pre-independence average, as outlined in equation ?? ; columns headed by βˆDDDjt report the trend- and placebo-demeaned independence dividend estimate, as defined in
equation 2 ; columns headed by βˆpurejt report the quadruple independence dividend estimate, as defined in equation 4. Standard errors are robust against heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation at the country level. Bootstrapped standard errors of the pure independence dividend based on 250 replications. The number of years after secession
is indicated on the horizontal axis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4: Semi-parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession in
transition countries
t = 0 + 1 t = 0 + 5 t = 0 + 20
Country βˆDDDjt βˆjt
DDDD
βˆDDDjt βˆjt
DDDD
βˆDDDjt βˆjt
DDDD
Armenia -0.75*** -0.51*** -0.73*** -0.51*** -0.09 0.13
Azerbaijan -0.42*** -0.18*** -1.20*** -0.98*** 0.28*** 0.50***
Belarus -0.18*** 0.06*** -0.51*** -0.28*** 0.40*** 0.62***
Croatia -0.65*** -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.31*** -0.60*** -0.45***
Czech Republic -0.28*** -0.07*** -0.31*** -0.11 -0.28*** -0.01
Estonia -0.37*** -0.13*** -0.35*** -0.13** 0.18*** 0.39***
Georgia -0.78*** -0.53*** -1.08*** -0.85*** -0.34*** -0.16
Kazakhstan -0.38*** -0.14*** -0.70*** -0.48*** 0.13** 0.35**
Kyrgyzstan -0.27*** -0.02 -0.80*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.36***
Latvia -0.71*** -0.47*** -0.82*** -0.60*** -0.34*** -0.12
Lithuania -0.42*** -0.18*** -0.68*** -0.45*** -0.07 0.14
Moldova -0.20*** 0.04** -0.89*** -0.67*** -0.47*** -0.25*
Montenegro 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.27*** 0.31***
Russia -0.17*** 0.12* -0.51*** -0.23*** 0.14** 0.34***
Slovakia -0.33*** -0.12*** -0.24*** -0.04 -0.06 0.21
Slovenia -0.47*** -0.26*** -0.40*** -0.20** -0.56*** -0.40***
Tajikistan -0.55*** -0.31*** -1.42*** -1.20*** -1.04*** -0.86***
Turkmenistan -0.22*** 0.02 -0.67*** -0.44*** -0.12** 0.10
Ukraine -0.16*** 0.09*** -0.97*** -0.74*** -0.59*** -0.39***
Uzbekistan -0.28*** -0.04 -0.49*** -0.27*** 0.06 0.27**
ZzSerbia 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.19**
Note: This table reports country-specific, semi-parametric estimates of the independence dividend.
Results are reported for all available newly formed transition countries and pertain to the 1st, 5th and
20th year after independence respectively. Columns headed by βˆDDDjt report the trend- and placebo-
demeaned independence dividend estimate, as defined in equation 2 ; columns headed by βˆDDDDjt
report the quadruple-difference independence dividend estimate, as defined in equation 5. Standard
errors are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. Bootstrapped
standard errors of the pure independence dividend based on 250 replications. The number of years
after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Determinants of the raw independence dividend
Bootstrap Feasible Generalized Least Squares
Channel (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
β¯ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
β¯placebo -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.05∗∗ 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Trade openness 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population size 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracy 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial crisis -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Battle deaths -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial per capita GDP 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.02 -0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Referendum dummy 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.07∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
EU dummy 0.11∗∗ 0.13∗
(0.10) (0.07)
OPEC dummy 0.23∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.05) (0.10)
NATO dummy -0.13∗∗ -0.11∗
(0.08) (0.07)
African Union dummy -0.46∗∗∗ -0.14
(0.06) (0.13)
ASEAN dummy 0.36∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.09) (0.15)
Observations [# countries] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77]
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years-of-independence dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bootstrap iterations 500 500 500 500 . . . .
Note: This table reports estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation (6), of several
determinants of the raw independence dividend, as defined in equation (10A). The first 4 columns report
bootstrapped standard errors, based on 500 iterations and robust against estimation uncertainty in the
country-year specific first-step independence dividend estimates. The last 4 columns report standard errors
computed by the feasible generalized least squares estimated-dependent-variable method proposed by Lewis
and Linzer (2005, p. 351-352).
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Table A6: Determinants of the trend-demeaned independence dividend
Bootstrap Feasible Generalized Least Squares
Channel (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
β¯ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ -0.03∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
β¯placebo -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Trade openness 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population size 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracy 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial crisis -0.05∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Battle deaths -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial per capita GDP 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.02 -0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Referendum dummy 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
EU dummy 0.13∗∗ 0.00
(0.09) (0.07)
OPEC dummy 0.19∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.10)
NATO dummy -0.14∗∗ -0.01
(0.09) (0.06)
African Union dummy -0.47∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗
(0.07) (0.14)
ASEAN dummy 0.37∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.09) (0.13)
Observations [# countries] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77]
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years-of-independence dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bootstrap iterations 500 500 500 500 . . . .
Note: This table reports estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation (6), of several
determinants of the trend-demeaned independence dividend, as defined in equation (1). The first 4 columns
report bootstrapped standard errors, based on 500 iterations and robust against estimation uncertainty in
the country-year specific first-step independence dividend estimates. The last 4 columns report standard
errors computed by the feasible generalized least squares estimated-dependent-variable method proposed
by Lewis and Linzer (2005, p. 351-352).
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Table A7: Determinants of the placebo-demeaned independence dividend
Bootstrap Feasible Generalized Least Squares
Channel (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
β¯ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
β¯placebo -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Trade openness 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population size 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracy 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.03∗ 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial crisis -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Battle deaths -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial per capita GDP 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Referendum dummy 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ -0.06 -0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
EU dummy 0.12∗∗ -0.06
(0.08) (0.13)
OPEC dummy 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07)
NATO dummy -0.14∗∗ -0.02
(0.10) (0.07)
African Union dummy -0.47∗∗∗ -0.26∗
(0.07) (0.14)
ASEAN dummy 0.36∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.09) (0.15)
Observations [# countries] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77] 2157 [77]
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years-of-independence dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bootstrap iterations 500 500 500 500 . . . .
Note: This table reports estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation (6), of several
determinants of the placebo-demeaned independence dividend. The first 4 columns report bootstrapped
standard errors, based on 500 iterations and robust against estimation uncertainty in the country-year
specific first-step independence dividend estimates. The last 4 columns report standard errors computed
by the feasible generalized least squares estimated-dependent-variable method proposed by Lewis and
Linzer (2005, p. 351-352).
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Figure A2: Average impact of secession in selected countries
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 d
iv
id
en
d
-10 0 10 20 30
Years of independence
with 95% confidence interval
(a) All cases
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 d
iv
id
en
d
-10 0 10 20 30
Years of independence
with 95% confidence interval
(b) 80% best matched cases
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(c) 60% best matched cases
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(d) 40% best matched cases
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(f) All cases within caliper
Note: This figure plots the yearly population-weighted average percentage per capita GDP gap between
NICs and their synthetic counterparts, along with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 500
iterations. The number of years before (-) or after (+) independence are indicated on the horizontal
axis. The top-left panel contains all available cases, subsequent panels include only results of the 80,
60, 40 and 20% best matched cases in terms of their pre-independence RMSPE. The bottom figure
includes only those cases for which the pre-independence RMSPE falls within the data-driven caliper
cut-off amounting to 0.5 times the samplewide standard deviation in pre-independence RMSPE.
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Figure A3: Cumulative estimates of independence dividends at selected time-points
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(a) Trend-demeaned
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(b) Triple-difference
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5th year after independence
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(a) Trend-demeaned
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(b) Triple-difference
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30th year after independence
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(a) Trend-demeaned
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(b) Triple-difference
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(c) Pure
Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of the country-specific trend-demeaned, triple-difference and pure independence dividend estimates
reported in table A2, along with 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal axis indicates the proportion of NICs with an independence dividend estimate below
the cut-off value indicated on the vertical axis. Estimated independence dividends pertain to the 1st, 5th and 30th post-independence year respectively.
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Figure A4: Quadruple-difference estimates of the independence dividend
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Note: The figures plot yearly, quadruple-difference estimates of the independence dividend trajectories
associated with selected historical instances of state fragmentation. Each gray line plots the trajectory of
a specific former member state; the black lines depict the aggregate independence dividend trajectory; the
dashed lines depict the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval, clustered at the country level and based on
250 replications. The number of years after independence is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A5: Semi-parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession: robustness results
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Note: The figure compares the baseline population-weighted triple-difference independence dividends (squares) with alternative triple-difference estimators that
respectively impose a spatial constraint to limit the pool of potential control countries to countries that are located in direct geographical proximity of the NIC under
consideration (full circles); or to countries that are on the contrary located far away from the NIC under consideration (traingles); or to countries that have been
independent for at least 30 years when the NIC under consideration declared independence (hollow circles). Block-bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are based on
500 iterations and are robust against heteroskedasticity, serial correlation at the country level and estimation uncertainty in individual independence dividend estimates.
The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A6: Determinants of the triple-difference independence dividend: fixed effects
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(a) Year fixed effects
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(b) Years-of-independence fixed effects
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Note: This figure respectively plots estimates for the year-fixed effects, the years-of-independence fixed effects, the region fixed effects and the most relevant mother-country fixed effects corresponding to the
bootstrap estimation models reported in columns (1a) through (4a) of table 4. Year fixed effects are relative to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are relative to the year of independence ; region fixed
effects are relative to East Asia & Pacific; mother-country fixed effects are relative to the Soviet Union.
75
